New/Old significant Avian Outbreaks in U.S./Canada
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Topic: New/Old significant Avian Outbreaks in U.S./Canada
Posted By: Guests
Subject: New/Old significant Avian Outbreaks in U.S./Canada
Date Posted: April 06 2007 at 6:05am
Virginia - Human Avian H7N2
http://www.exoticpetvet.net/avian/influenza.html - http://www.exoticpetvet.net/avian/influenza.html
In the United States in 2002, Virginia experienced an outbreak of avian influenza A (H7N2) in which 4.7 million turkeys and chickens were destroyed. One
culler developed upper respiratory signs and was subsequently tested
and found to have antibodies to avian influenza A (H7N2). Nasal
swabs and other specimens suitable for viral isolation were not
collected, and therefore virus isolation could not be performed.
Note:
In 2003, there was an outbreak in the Netherlands with H7N7 avian
influenza A, causing symptoms of upper respiratory disease and
conjunctivitis. This outbreak of avian influenza A H7 occurred mostly
among poultry workers. H7 viruses are not as dangerous as the H5N1
viruses that are currently causing serious problems in Asia at this
time. The H7 avian influenza A viruses are not nearly as dangerous as
some of the other strains that are not H7. The H7 viruses seem to cause
less serious disease symptoms, and it has primarily caused illness
among poultry workers.
It should be noted that the use of personal protective equipment is
mandatory for all persons involved in poultry culling activities, which
should minimize infection in poultry workers. Human infection with the
H7 avian influenza viruses is rare, however persons who have had close
contact with infected birds may become infected and exhibit symptoms,
most commonly conjunctivitis and/or upper respiratory symptoms. The
risk of infection to poultry workers is low, especially when persons
wear appropriate personal protective equipment and follow standard
depopulation procedures when in contact with infected birds.
The reported symptoms of avian influenza in humans have ranged from
typical influenza-like symptoms (cough, sore throat, fever and muscle
aches) to eye infections, pneumonia, acute respiratory distress, viral
pneumonia and other severe and life-threatening complications.
Diagnosis is made by using certain tests, such as reverse
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and cell culture of
material obtained from nasal swabs. An antiviral medication,
oseltamivir, TamifluTM, Roche Laboratories, is used as a treatment for
influenza A and B, and as prophylaxis within 48 hours of exposure, to
help treat a person exposed to or infected with this virus. Studies to
date suggest that these prescription medications approved for human
influenza strains would be effective in preventing avian influenza
infections in humans. However, sometimes flu strains can become
resistant to these drugs and so they may not always be effective.
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Replies:
Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: April 06 2007 at 6:10am
Duck Hunters in Iowa H11N9 - Avian antibodies from CDC
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no08/06-0492.htm - http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no08/06-0492.htm
Hunters and Wildlife Professionals
James S. Gill,* Comments to Author Richard Webby,† Mary J.R. Gilchrist,* and Gregory C. Gray‡
*University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory, Iowa City, Iowa, USA; †St Jude
Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA; and ‡University
of Iowa College of Public Health, Iowa City, Iowa, USA
Suggested citation for this article
We report serologic evidence of avian
influenza infection in 1 duck hunter and 2 wildlife professionals with
extensive histories of wild waterfowl and game bird exposure. Two
laboratory methods showed evidence of past infection with influenza
A/H11N9, a less common virus strain in wild ducks, in these 3 persons.
Wild ducks, geese, and shorebirds are the natural reservoir for
influenza A virus (1); all 16 hemagglutinin (H) and 9 neuraminidase (N)
subtypes are found in these wild birds (1,2). Recently, the rapid
spread of influenza A/H5N1 virus to new geographic regions, possibly by
migrating waterfowl, has caused concern among public health officials
who fear an influenza pandemic. Until now, serologic studies of the
transmission of subtype H5N1 and other highly pathogenic strains of
avian influenza have focused on humans who have contact with infected
domestic poultry (3,4). In this cross-sectional seroprevalence study,
we provide evidence of past influenza A/H11 infection in persons who
were routinely, heavily exposed to wild ducks and geese through
recreational activities (duck hunting) or through their employment
(bird banding). To our knowledge, this study is the first to show direct transmission of influenza A viruses from wild birds to humans.
The Study
In mid-October 2004, we enrolled 39 duck hunters who were hunting in
southeastern Iowa at Lake Odessa Wildlife Management Area, the state's
only limited-access public waterfowl hunting area managed by the Iowa
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). In February 2005 we enrolled 68
Iowa DNR employees, many of whom had duck hunted or had been involved
annually in capturing and banding wild ducks and geese as part of their
duties of employment. Ten (15%) of the 68 DNR workers reported no
contact with ducks. The duck-hunting group consisted of men >16
years of age, and the DNR group consisted of 65 men and 3 women
enrollees. The average age of the duck hunters and DNR workers was 34
and 47 years, respectively. The average number of years of waterfowl or
bird exposure of the duck hunters and DNR workers was 19.8 and 21.5,
respectively. In the 3 years before the study, influenza vaccine had
been administered to 37% of the duck hunters and 35% of the DNR
workers.
Microneutralization assay, adapted per Rowe et al. (5), was
performed on all serum samples with influenza A subtypes H1 through H12
from avian sources. Virus at 100 TCID50 (50% tissue culture infective
dose)/50 μL was incubated at 37°C for 2 h with heat-inactivated serum
in 96-well plates. One hundred microliters of trypsinized London MDCK
cells at 2 × 105 cells/mL, grown to 70%–95% confluency, was added to
each well. After 24 h at 37°C, the cells were acetone-fixed, and
horseradish peroxidase–based ELISA was performed with mouse-specific
anti-influenza A antibody. Optical density was read at 450 nm. All
tested virus isolates were titrated with and without trypsin in the
University of Iowa's Emerging Pathogens Laboratory; no significant
difference in titers was observed. Backtiter controls were performed
with each microneutralization assay.
Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay with horse erythrocytes,
adapted per Meijer et al. (6), was performed on all hunter serum
samples by using avian influenza A subtype H11. Heat-inactivated serum
treated with receptor-destroying enzyme was first heme-adsorbed with
packed horse erythrocytes. Serum was then incubated with virus at 8
hemagglutinin U/50 μL with 1% horse erythrocytes in 0.5% bovine serum
albumin in phosphate-buffered saline for 1 h at room temperature in
V-bottom plates. The plates were then examined.
One 39-year-old duck hunter had a titer of 40, and 2 male DNR
workers, ages 52 and 53, had titers of 10 against influenza
A/H11N9/duck/Memphis/546/76 by microneutralization assay (Table). These
3 study participants had substantial lifetime exposures to wild
waterfowl. The duck hunter and the 2 DNR workers had 31, 27, and 30
years of duck-hunting experience, respectively. The duck hunter spent
25–60 days in the marsh each year hunting ducks. He harvested 100 ducks
annually and handled another 300 ducks with his hunting partners during
the duck-hunting season from mid-September to early December. One of
the positive DNR workers (age 52) had several years of live wild
duck–banding exposure as part of his annual duties of employment, in
addition to 27 years of duck-hunting exposure. Each year this wildlife
professional had contact with >100 live ducks during the banding
season in late August and early September. Serum samples from all other
study participants were negative against subtype H11N9 according to
results of microneutralization assay and horse erythrocyte HI assays.
The duck hunter's serum was not reactive to any other avian influenza
hemagglutinin subtypes tested (H1–H10 and H12). The sera of the 2
H11-positive DNR workers had titers of 10 for influenza
A/H2N2/mallard/NY/6750/78 according to microneutralization assay
results and were negative for H1, H3–H10, and H12. Results of the H11
microneutralization assay were verified by horse erythrocyte HI assay
that used subtype H11N9 virus. The titers by horse HI assay of the
microneutralization assay–positive duck hunter and the 2 DNR workers
were 10 or 20 (Table). These 3 study participants had not been
vaccinated against influenza within 3 years before the study.
References
1. Stallknecht DE, Shane SM. Host range of avian influenza virus in free-living birds. Vet Res Commun. 1988;12:125–41.
2. Fouchier RA, Munster V, Wallensten A, Bestebroer TM, Herfst S,
Smith D, et al. Characterization of a novel influenza A virus
hemagglutinin subtype (H16) obtained from black-headed gulls. J Virol.
2005;79:2814–22.
3. Bridges CB, Lim W, Hu-Primmer J, Sims L, Fukuda K, Mak KH, et
al. Risk of influenza A (H5N1) infection among poultry workers, Hong
Kong, 1997–1998. J Infect Dis. 2002;185:1005–10.
4. Koopmans M, Wilbrink B, Conyn M, Natrop G, van der Nat H,
Vennema H, et al. Transmission of H7N7 avian influenza A virus to human
beings during a large outbreak in commercial poultry farms in the
Netherlands. Lancet. 2004;363:587–93.
5. Rowe T, Abernathy RA, Hu-Primmer J, Thompson WW, Lu X, Lim W,
et al. Detection of antibody to avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in human
serum by using a combination of serologic assays. J Clin Microbiol.
1999;37:937–43.
6. Meijer A, Bosman A, van de Kamp EE, Wilbrink B, van Beest
Holle Mdu R, Koopmans M. Measurement of antibodies to avian influenza
virus A (H7N7) in humans by hemagglutination inhibition test. J Virol
Methods. 2006;132:113–20.
7. Hinshaw VS, Wood JM, Webster RG, Deibel R, Turner B.
Circulation of influenza viruses and paramyxoviruses in waterfowl
originating from two different areas in North America. Bull World
Health Organ. 1985;63:711–9.
8. Stallknecht DE, Shane SM, Zwank PJ, Senne DA, Kearney MT.
Avian influenza viruses from migratory and resident ducks of coastal
Louisiana. Avian Dis. 1990;34:398–405.
9. Ramirez A, Capuano AW, Wellman DA, Lesher KA, Setterquist SF,
Gray GC. Preventing zoonotic influenza infection. Emerg Infect Dis.
2006;12:997–1000.
10. Fouchier RA, Schneeberger PM, Rozendaal FW, Broekmen JM,
Kemink SA, Munster V, et al. Avian influenza A virus (H7N7) associated
with human conjunctivitis and a fatal case of acute respiratory
distress syndrome. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2004;101:1356–61.
11. Kurtz J, Manvell RJ, Banks J. Avian influenza virus isolated from a woman with conjunctivitis. Lancet. 1996;348:901–2.
12. Beare AS, Webster RG. Replication of avian influenza viruses in humans. Arch Virol. 1991:119:37–42.
13. Krauss S, Walker D, Pryor SP, Niles L, Chenghong L, Hinshaw
VS, et al. Influenza A viruses of migrating wild aquatic birds in North
America. Vector-Borne Zoonotic Dis. 2004;4:177–89.
14. Hanson BA, Stallknecht DE, Swayne DE, Lewis LA, Senne DA.
Avian influenza viruses in Minnesota ducks during 1998–2000. Avian Dis.
2003; 47:867–71.
15. Slemons RD, Hansen WR, Converse KA, Senne DA. Type A
influenza virus surveillance in free-flying, nonmigratory ducks
residing on the eastern shore of Maryland. Avian Dis. 2003;47:1107–10.
Comment : Later on in the final conclusion the early conclusion is
refuted. To the best of my recollection when I first found this article
no such text was included to refute the first statement.
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Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: April 06 2007 at 6:15am
Avian in New York - 2003
H7N2 in New York – 2003
In November 2003, a patient with serious underlying medical conditions
was admitted to a hospital in New York with respiratory symptoms. One
of the initial laboratory tests identified an influenza A virus that
was thought to be H1N1. The patient recovered and went home after a few
weeks. Subsequent
confirmatory tests conducted in March showed that the patient had been
infected with an H7N2 avian influenza A virus.
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Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: April 06 2007 at 6:20am
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no12/04-0961.htm - http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no12/04-0961.htm
FRAZER VALLEY - BRITISH COLUMBIA - CANADA
http://www.exoticpetvet.net/avian/influenza.html - http://www.exoticpetvet.net/avian/influenza.html
Two poultry workers in the Fraser Valley region of British Columbia
were confirmed by testing. Clinical signs were unilateral (one sided)
conjunctivitis and upper respiratory symptoms in one patient, and
unilateral conjunctivitis and headache in the second. There is
currently no evidence of person-to-person transmission of avian
influenza in this outbreak.
The strain here was not given. Likely to have been the same H7N7 avian influenza A, in the human outbreak in the Netherlands.
Human Illness from Avian Influenza H7N3, British Columbia
Avian influenza that infects poultry in close proximity to humans is a concern because of its pandemic potential. In 2004, an
outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N3 occurred in poultry
in British Columbia, Canada. Surveillance identified two persons with
confirmed avian influenza infection. Symptoms included conjunctivitis
and mild influenzalike illness.
Influenza is the most diversified in birds, particularly in wild
waterfowl (1). Concern exists that outbreaks of avian influenza in
domestic poultry could, through a process of genetic reassortment,
mutation, or both, introduce new influenza subtypes into the human
population. In the context of widespread susceptibility, such an event
could be the precursor of a pandemic (2,3).
An outbreak of avian influenza emerged on a farm in the Fraser
Valley of British Columbia on February 6, 2004. Slightly increased
deaths (8–16 deaths/day) were noted among 9,200 chickens in one barn.
Avian influenza infection was confirmed on February 16, 2004, and later
genotypic and phenotypic intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) testing
characterized the virus as low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI)
H7N3. On the same farm, an adjacent barn that contained 9,030 chickens
had a dramatic increased in deaths from February 17 through 19 (2,000
deaths in 2 days). Genotypic and IVPI testing confirmed highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N3 in this second flock.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency ordered the culling of both
flocks and initiated active avian influenza surveillance on all farms
within 5 km, but the virus spread nonetheless. On April 5, the Canadian
Food Inspection Agency ordered depopulation of all poultry in the
Fraser Valley south of the Fraser River (19 million birds). In total,
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency identified avian influenza in 42 of
the ≈600 commercial poultry farms in the region and in 11 backyard
flocks, which represented ≈1.3 million birds (4). The last infected
farm was identified on May 21, 2004.
To mitigate the risk for human infection and the potential for
genetic reassortment, federal workers involved in the depopulation were
required to wear personal protective equipment, including N95/North
7700 masks, gloves, goggles, and biosafety suits and footwear. They
were also required to take prophylactic oseltamivir at a dose of 75 mg
per day for the duration of exposure plus 7 days and to receive the
commercially available human influenza vaccine for the 2003-04 season,
if they had not already done so (5). All protective measures were
provided free of charge and were recommended also for exposed farm
workers and their families. Following reports of human illness, these
measures were more rigorously promoted and reinforced through worker
screening, information letters prepared by the British Columbia Centre
for Disease Control, and media bulletins.
We report the results of enhanced surveillance for human illness in
association with this poultry outbreak of HPAI H7N3 in British
Columbia.
The Study
After the first report to public health authorities of poultry
outbreaks on February 18, 2004, enhanced surveillance for
conjunctivitis and influenzalike illnesses was implemented for federal
workers, farm workers and their household contacts, and any other
potentially exposed persons. Illness was reported to the British
Columbia Centre for Disease Control by using a standard questionnaire
and report form. Respiratory specimens were tested at the British
Columbia Centre for Disease Control by reverse transcription–polymerase
chain reaction for influenza and by cell culture for all respiratory
pathogens; influenza isolates were sequenced to determine the subtype
(e.g., H7). Suspected human cases were defined as illness in persons
presenting after February 6, 2004, with two or more new or worsening
conjunctivitis or influenzalike symptoms, with onset from 1 day after
first exposure (defined as direct contact or shared air space) to 7
days after last exposure to a potential source of avian influenza virus
in the Fraser Valley. Confirmed
cases had laboratory-confirmed influenza A (H7) virus in conjunctival,
nasal, nasopharyngeal, or throat specimens by reverse
transcription–polymerase chain reaction (6) or cell culture. Influenza
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtyping was performed at the National
Microbiology Laboratory. Serum samples were tested for antibody to
influenza A (H7) by hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization
assays (7) at the National Microbiology Laboratory. Microneutralization
assays were repeated at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention on serum samples from two persons with confirmed infections
and from eight persons with suspected cases.
Approximately 2,000 poultry farm workers are in the Fraser Valley.
Approximately 650 federal workers assisted with outbreak management and
control; not all had poultry exposure. From February 18 to June 1,
2004, a total of 77 symptomatic persons were reported to the British
Columbia Centre for Disease Control. Fifty-seven had suspected (n = 55)
or confirmed (n = 2) avian influenza infections.
Among the 20 reports that did not meet the suspected or confirmed
case definitions, 9 had insufficient information to determine case
status, 3 did not meet the symptom requirements, 3 did not have a
relevant exposure history, 1 had onset before February 6, 3 had onset
>7 days after exposure, and 1 had onset <1>48 hours after
onset or refused treatment. All recovered fully.
Respiratory specimens (nasal, nasopharyngeal, throat, and
conjunctival) were collected from 47 patients with suspected cases
(86%) an average of 5 days after onset (range 0–27 days). Cell culture
identified pathogens in two persons: adenovirus type 3 in one
(conjunctival and nasal specimens) and HSV-1 in another (throat
specimen). All other results were negative for respiratory viruses,
including influenza. No antibody to influenza A H7 could be detected in
paired acute- and convalescent-phase serum samples (n = 17), drawn an
average of 9 days (range 0–33 days) and 31 days (range 18–88 days)
after onset, respectively, or in convalescent-phase serum samples (n = drawn an average of 28 days (range 8–56) after onset from patients with suspected cases.
Influenza A H7N3 infection was confirmed in two men (40 and 45 years of
age) exposed on different farms March 13 and March 22–23. Both had
direct conjunctival contact with infected poultry. One was not wearing
eye protection, and the other was wearing glasses that were bypassed by
a feather. Neither was taking oseltamivir prophylaxis. Neither was
vaccinated against human influenza virus. Symptoms developed 1–3 days
after exposure (March 16 and 24). Conjunctivitis and coryza developed
in the first patient, and conjunctivitis and headache developed in the
second. Both received oseltamivir treatment, and symptoms resolved
fully. Active daily surveillance by the local health unit identified no
secondary cases.
Influenza A H7N3 virus was isolated from a nasal specimen from one
man (A/Canada/444/04) and a conjunctival specimen from the other
(A/Canada/504/04); both samples were collected within 1 day of onset.
No antibody to influenza A H7 could be detected by hemagglutination
inhibition or microneutralization assays in serum samples collected 34
days and 8 and 22 days after onset, respectively.
Virus isolated from birds on the same source farm as the human
isolate A/Canada/444/04 was confirmed as HPAI H7N3 by genotyping and
IVPI. Virus from birds on the same source farm as A/Canada/504/04
showed insertion sequence match with HPAI H7N3, but IVPI was not
performed (C. Kranendonk, National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease,
pers. comm.). Both human isolates contained an insertion sequence
similar to that seen only in the HPAI avian virus. These insertion
sequences vary from the poultry virus by one and two amino acid
differences, respectively. Based on the consensus sequence for HPAI H7
viruses, only A/Canada/504/04 is likely highly pathogenic in chickens (. Phenotypic pathogenicity testing on the human isolates is ongoing.
Conclusions
We report the first known human avian influenza H7N3 infections.
Although enhanced surveillance identified 57 persons meeting a
suspected case definition, avian influenza infection was confirmed in
only 2. The two patients had conjunctivitis and mild, influenzalike
illnesses, similar to symptoms reported from the Netherlands in
association with another H7 subtype (H7N7) (9). Neither confirmed case
in British Columbia mounted a hemagglutination inhibition or serum
neutralizing antibody response. This finding has been observed
elsewhere in association with avian influenza infection (10,11). A
possible explanation includes highly localized infection without
induction of systemic antibody. Mechanical trauma, irritation due to
dust or airborne particulate matter, or an allergic cause of symptoms
associated with viral contamination, rather than infection, is less
likely given the delay to symptom onset, consistent with the incubation
period for influenza.
Among suspected cases, respiratory rather than conjunctival
symptoms predominated. Other pathogens were also detected among
suspected case reports, a finding consistent with the relatively
nonspecific case definition applied.
From February 6 to May 21, 2004, routine influenza surveillance
activities in the Fraser Valley also identified human influenza A from
nine persons and two long-term care facility outbreaks. Although no
coinfections were identified, this human influenza activity increased
concerns about potential mixture of avian influenza with human
influenza strains.
Avian influenza H7 has caused human illness previously, most
notably 89 confirmed human infections, including one death in the
Netherlands in 2003 (9). Based on the precedent set by the Netherlands
in protecting exposed persons, British Columbia recommended
comprehensive precautions for workers early in the outbreak. These
precautions may have prevented further human infections. The strain
circulating in British Columbia may have been more limited in its
ability to cause human illness. The genomic sequence of the avian
viruses from the source farms of the two human isolates was consistent
with HPAI, whereas one of the human isolates was consistent with LPAI.
The presence of an insertion sequence in the human LPAI isolate likely
signifies that the virus in poultry mutated from HPAI to LPAI, and both
were circulating among the birds on that source farm, the latter
undetected. A less likely explanation is that mutation from HPAI to
LPAI occurred in the human host.
To date, illness in humans from H7 subtypes differs markedly in
severity from that of avian influenza H5N1 (12). Their lower virulence
should not be inferred to indicate lower pandemic potential since
subclinical or mild infections may have greater opportunity through
surreptitious spread to reassort and through mutation to become more
virulent. A compilation and detailed overview of the protective
measures used in all avian influenza outbreaks would help to estimate
the actual risk to persons and populations. Recommendations for
precautions that are both necessary and reasonable during future
poultry outbreaks could then be refined.
Ms. Tweed is an epidemiologist at the British Columbia Centre for
Disease Control. Her main research interests are vaccine-preventable,
respiratory, and emerging infectious diseases.
References
1. Suarez DL, Spackman E, Senne DA. Update on molecular
epidemiology of H1, H5, and H7 influenza virus infections in poultry in
North America. Avian Dis. 2003;47:888–97.
2. Trampuz A, Prabhu RM, Smith TF, Baddour LM. Avian influenza: a new pandemic threat? Mayo Clin Proc. 2004;79:523–30.
3. Zambon MC. The pathogenesis of influenza in humans. Rev Med Virol. 2001;11:227–41.
4. Lees W, Chown L, Inch C. A short summary of the 2004 outbreak
of high pathogenicity avian influenza (H7N3) in British Columbia,
Canada. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Animal
Products, Animal Health and Production Division; 2004.
5. National Advisory Committee on Immunization. Update: statement
on influenza vaccination for the 2003-04 Season. Canadian Communicable
Disease Report. 2004;30:1–5.
6. Spackman E, Senne DA, Myers TJ, Bulaga LL, Garber LP, Perdue
ML, et al. Development of a real-time reverse transcriptase PCR assay
for type A influenza virus and the avian H5 and H7 hemagglutinin
subtypes. J Clin Microbiol. 2002;40:3256–60.
7. Rowe T, Abernathy RA, Hu-Primmer J, Thompson WW, Lu X, Lim W,
et al. Detection of antibody to avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in human
serum by using a combination of serologic assays. J Clin.Microbiol.
1999;37:937–43.
8. Hirst M, Astell CR, Griffith M, Coughlin SM, Moksa M, Zeng T,
et al. Novel avian influenza H7N3 strain outbreak, British Columbia.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2004;10:2192–5.
9. Koopmans M, Wilbrink B, Conyn M, Natrop G, van der Nat H,
Vennema H, et al. Transmission of H7N7 avian influenza A virus to human
beings during a large outbreak in commercial poultry farms in the
Netherlands. Lancet. 2004;363:587–93.
10. Alexander DJ, Brown IH. Recent zoonoses caused by influenza A viruses. Rev Sci Tech. 2000;19:197–225.
11. Kurtz J, Manvell RJ, Banks J. Avian influenza virus isolated from a woman with conjunctivitis. Lancet. 1996;348:901–2.
12. Tran TH, Nguyen TL, Nguyen TD, Luong TS, Pham PM, Nguyen VC,
et al. Avian influenza A (H5N1) in 10 patients in Vietnam. N Engl J
Med. 2004;350:1179–88.
Suggested citation for this article:
Tweed SA, Skowronski DM, David ST, Larder A, Petric M, Lees M, et
al. Human illness from avian influenza H7N3, British Columbia. Emerg
Infect Dis [serial on the Internet]. 2004 Dec [date cited]. Available
from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no12/04-0961.htm - http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no12/04-0961.htm
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Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: April 06 2007 at 6:27am
RECENT OUT BREAK DATA OF AVIAN IN WEST VIRGINIA
25, 000 Turkeys Slaughtered at W.Va. Farm
25, 000 Turkeys Slaughtered at W.Va. Farm
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: April 3, 2007
Filed at 1:26 a.m. ET
CHARLESTON, W.Va. (AP) -- A strain of avian flu different from the one
that has infected humans in Africa and Asia was detected at a turkey
farm, requiring the slaughter of 25,000 birds, state agriculture
officials said Monday.
''People should not be worried,'' said Buddy Davidson, a spokesman
for the state Agriculture Department. ''This should not affect the
average person at all.''
The turkeys are being destroyed to prevent the virus, which can kill birds, from mutating and spreading.
Authorities are telling poultry farms in five counties not to remove any bird bedding or manure until testing can be done.
The flu was detected during routine screening. Routine tests have
been done since a 2002 outbreak in Virginia. as posted by New York Times
=================================================
Avain flu found at farm
Strain poses no risk to humans
By Tara Tuckwiller
Staff writer
About 25,000 turkeys were being destroyed Monday at a Pendleton County
farm after avian flu was found there — a low-pathogenic strain humans
can’t catch, government officials said.
The virus, H5N2, typically causes no symptoms or only minor
sickness in birds. The turkeys at the farm showed no symptoms. Routine
blood tests, now required for every flock before it is moved, revealed
the virus, state agriculture department spokesman Buddy Davidson said.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s national lab confirmed the
test results Saturday, and the USDA released a public statement Sunday
night, Davidson said.
H5N2 was last detected in West Virginia in 2002. That time, about 14,000 chickens on a Hardy County farm were destroyed.
The recent infection was found on a southern Pendleton County farm
that produces for the Virginia Poultry Growers Cooperative. Officials
are not releasing the exact location of the farm or the name of the
farmer, “both for the farmer’s privacy and for biosecurity,” Davidson
said. If people or vehicles visited the farm, they could carry the
virus away and spread it.
“We’re being extra careful even with our own personnel, to minimize any traffic between that farm and anywhere else.”
No infection has been found at neighboring farms. The USDA
statement said “all poultry operations within a six mile radius of the
affected farm will be closely monitored.”
The turkeys were all expected to euthanized by Monday night,
Davidson said. By the end of the day today, they will be moved to
another location on the farm for composting, he said. Then the poultry
house can be decontaminated. “There would be no reason [the farmer]
couldn’t go back into business in the not-too-distant future,” Davidson
said.
The USDA will pay the farmer for his losses.
While low-pathogenic avian flus like the one found in Pendleton
County pose no human health risk, “USDA’s policy is to eradicate all H5
and H7 subtypes because of their potential to mutate into highly
pathogenic avian influenza, which has a high mortality rate among
birds,” the USDA statement said.
A highly pathogenic avian flu, H5N1, has spread through Asia,
Europe and Africa, killing 170 people since 2003, according to the
World Health Organization.
International animal health standards now require countries to
report all H5 and H7 detections, but the USDA said this “should not
significantly impact U.S. exports of poultry and poultry products.”
Poultry is West Virginia’s biggest agriculture industry, with $223 million in cash receipts in 2005.
On Monday, state Agriculture Commissioner Gus Douglass ordered a halt
to any movement of poultry manure in Pendleton, Mineral, Hardy,
Hampshire and Grant counties for at least 30 days. Farmers must not
clean out their poultry houses or apply any manure to land, as part of
the state’s avian flu response protocol.
It is unknown how the turkeys got the virus.
“I’m sure that is going to be looked at in the near future,”
Davidson said. “At this point, we’re concentrating on operations. We
may never know where it came from.”
================================================
Can H5N2 become HiPath or spread to humans?
OLD RESEARCH)
The deadly H5N1 virus has killed at least 76 people worldwide since 2003.
(AP) Up to 77 people in Japan may have
been infected with a mild form of bird flu, in what could be the
world's first case of human infection of the H5N2 virus, health
officials said Tuesday.
The possible past sufferers, mostly chicken farm workers, came from two
prefectures, Saitama and Ibaraki, outside of Tokyo, a Health Ministry
official said on condition of anonymity, citing internal policy.
Those who may have been infected
showed evidence of antibodies to the H5N2 virus, which is weaker than
the deadly H5N1 form, the official said. No virus had been found among
them.
No human infection of the milder strain had been reported, and the
latest results showed a possibility of bird-to-human transmission of
the H5N2 virus for the first time, the ministry official said. The
absence of flu-like symptoms among them, however, means the there is
little chance of developing a full-blown disease from it, she said.
None of them showed signs of the disease and there was no danger
that they would or infect others, she said, but added that the ministry
planned to follow up on their health conditions.
In related developments:
# Preliminary tests Tuesday showed another person in Turkey has
tested positive for a deadly strain of bird flu, raising the number in
the country to 15, a Health Ministry official said. The number of
people hospitalized with symptoms also climbed to about 70, officials
said.
# On Tuesday, workers in Turkey continued killing birds across the
country as Turks observed the beginning of the Eid al-Adha, the most
important holiday of the Islamic year. Turkey has also stepped up an
awareness campaign to combat the bird flu outbreak, with imams warning
about the danger through loudspeakers.
# Bulgaria launched a bird flu prevention campaign Tuesday, which
includes general information on bird flu and advice on avoiding contact
with birds, following strict hygiene and eating only well-cooked
poultry products and eggs. "The instructions will be publicized through
regional health care inspectors, general practitioners, mayors and
media," the Health Ministry said in a statement.
# Russian President Vladimir Putin called on Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov on Tuesday to develop a plan to prevent bird flu in Russia. "We
must do everything possible in order not to allow this problem to
emerge here," Putin told a meeting of top government officials. The
country's chief epidemiologist also announced heightened inspections on
its southern border and of people arriving from Turkey.
In Japan, seventy people have tested positive for antibodies to the
H5N2 in Ibaraki, about 65 miles north of Tokyo, and seven others in
Saitama, just outside the capital, have tested positive for the same
antibodies, the ministry official said.
Saitama health official Tatemitsu Yoshida said the central
government notified prefectural officials that the results do not pose
any serious problems, but poultry farm workers should take appropriate
measures such as wearing masks and washing their hands frequently.
The much more deadly H5N1 virus has killed at least 76 people
worldwide since 2003, according to the World Health Organization's Web
page.
Japan so far has suffered one case of human infection of the more deadly virus, but no deaths.
There have been several outbreaks of bird flu among poultry flocks
in the two prefectures, mostly in Ibaraki since last year. A total of
353 chicken farm employees at affected farms as well as quarantine
officials have undergone various tests since the outbreak started in
June, the ministry official said.
Japan has culled hundreds of thousands of birds to stop the
disease's spread since it was detected in the country in 2004 for the
first time in decades.
Ibaraki alone had culled 2.5 million birds since the outbreak began, prefectural health official Masahiko Shimada said.
Most of the human infections in the world have been linked to
direct contact with sick poultry, but scientists fear that the virus
could mutate into a form that spreads easily between humans, sparking a
global flu pandemic that could kill millions.
There is no known cure or vaccination for H5N1 in humans.
This is old news - but there is a pattern of H5N2 going hi path and
also transferring to people. To say an infection in birds of H5N2 is
not a potential problem for humans is not true. It is a potential
problem.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/bc3517d5-1793-4cf6-9359-183ac707bf7c.html - http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/bc3517d5-1793-4cf6-9359-183ac707bf7c.html
And our medical observations show that there have been no human cases," Onishchenko said.
In related news, more than 19,000 chickens on a farm in Taiwan were
slaughtered Jan 15, 2004 because of an infection with H5N2 influenza, a
less pathogenic strain than H5N1, according to an online report in the
Taipei Times. Birds at 21 other farms within 1 kilometer of the
affected farm were inspected and found to be healthy, the report said.
The last outbreak of highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HP AI) affecting the layer industry in the US was in
1983-84 when H5N2 was found in Pennsylvania and Virginia. There was a small H5N2 HP AI outbreak in Texas in 2004 in broilers. The AI strain in Texas was not clinically
highly pathogenic in the birds; however, it was genetically similar to
other highly pathogenic strains and was classified as HP AI. H5N2 has
not been associated with any human illnesses.
Comment : H5N2 is not a classic low
path Avian in chickens. It has a history of on numerous occasions going
high path. And this classically occured in Pennsylvania Virginia..much
too close to WV to be ignored.
http://depts.washington.edu/einet/newsbrief77.html?article=1303#1303 - http://depts.washington.edu/einet/newsbrief77.html?article=1303#1303
Japan (Saitama and Ibaraki): World’s first confirmed human cases of H5N2 infection
The world's first confirmed human cases of less pathogenic avian
influenza virus infection are too "risky to ignore," even though none
of those affected have had health problems, Japanese
officials warned. The H5N2 strain [serotype of avian influenza virus],
a milder form than the H5N1 serotype, needs global attention, because
it could mutate, they said 11 Jan 2006. "In the past, there was
a case where a mild strain [i.e. a LPAI (low pathogenic avian
influenza) virus] eventually transformed to a lethal one for chickens
[i.e. a HPAI (highly pathogenic avian influenza) virus]," warned a
researcher at the National Institute of Infectious Diseases.
The Japanese government said that 77
farm workers had been infected with H5N2, after tests on 350 workers
and their families at affected chicken farms. The workers are the
world's first to test positive for the mild strain. Chickens at
some 40 farms in Ibaraki Prefecture have been infected with H5N2 since
June 2005. The human infections probably took place before the
infections were detected in chickens in the areas. The people were
probably exposed to the virus while dealing with chickens and their
excrement without taking proper preventive measures. The Health
Ministry said it asked the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry
and local governments to adopt preventive measures such as advising
workers at chicken farms to put on masks at work even if no
abnormalities have been found in chickens.
According to WHO, an H5N2
epidemic in birds in 1983-1984 in the USA originally caused little
death, but within 6 months reached a mortality rate of 90 percent.
Japan, which has stockpiled Tamiflu in case of an avian influenza
pandemic, designates all H5 [serotype] strains as avian influenza,
requiring the killing of the infected chicken. "If a patient with
conventional human influenza is infected by mild bird flu, it could
create a new type of human influenza strain for which no vaccine or
medicine are prepared," the institute's scientist said. "Because it is
winter, and it is the season for influenza, the authorities should keep
their eyes on even the milder avian influenza viruses," he said.
Japan's Health and Welfare Ministry instructed poultry workers to take
preventive measures, such as wearing masks and washing their hands
frequently. "Workers who were infected with human influenza should
avoid working in poultry farms," the Ministry said. But no one has been
found to fall ill from the mild strain. Japan is the only country to
treat H5N2 as an infectious disease, the researcher said. "I hope these
cases provide a warning whistle to countries worldwide," he said.
"Scientists only found in 1997 that avian influenza is infectious for
human beings, and now we know that a milder [form] of the avian virus,
which is hard to detect because it doesn't [produce] any physical
symptoms, can infect human beings," he said.
“Interim Report on a Serological Survey for [Human] Antibodies to
the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Ibaraki and Saitama
Prefectures” (10 Jan 2006) is available at the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare website: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2006/01/h0110-4.html - http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2006/01/h0110-4.html (in Japanese). (Promed 1/8/06, 1/10/06, 1/11/06, 1/12/06)
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