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Experts debate research pause, gain-of-function is |
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arirish
Admin Group Joined: June 19 2013 Location: Arkansas Status: Offline Points: 39215 |
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Posted: December 16 2014 at 7:24am |
Experts debate research pause, gain-of-function issues
Filed Under: Bioterrorism ; Dual-Use Research Jim Wappes | Editorial Director | CIDRAP News | Dec 15, 2014 In anticipation of today's debate at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in Washington, DC, on "gain-of-function" (GOF) research, two recent editorials and three other opinion pieces in mBio discussed the US government's decision earlier this fall to pause controversial GOF research that might elevate the risks of a pandemic as a result of a bioterror attack or accidental pathogen release. See full transcript @:http://www.avianflutalk.com/new_topic_form.asp?FID=6 |
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CRS, DrPH
Expert Level Adviser Joined: January 20 2014 Location: Arizona Status: Offline Points: 26660 |
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Thank you, Arirish! This is an incredibly important event for all of us.
I serve as a Charter Member of the "Cambridge Working Group," an international consortium of public health scientists who organized in order to voice our concern over the loosely-regulated "gain of function" (GOF) experiments with dangerous pathogens such as avian influenza, SARS etc. My associate, Dr. Mark Lipsitch of the Harvard University School of Public Health, wrote a very important editorial on the subject, I urge all of us to take the time to read it. This is very important to us, since a simple lab accident from a university could potentially spring a pandemic on humanity, and the risks far outweigh the benefits that Dr. Kawaoka and others claim. http://mbio.asm.org/content/5/6/e02366-14.full Research on highly pathogenic organisms is crucial for medicine and public health, and we strongly support it. This work creates a foundation of new knowledge that provides critical insights around the world’s most deadly infectious diseases, and it can lay groundwork for the future development of new diagnostics, medicines, and vaccines. Almost all such research can be performed in ways that pose negligible or no risk of epidemic or global spread of a novel pathogen. However, research that aims to create new potential pandemic pathogens (PPP) (1)—novel microbes that combine likely human virulence with likely efficient transmission in humans—is an exception to that rule. While this research represents a tiny portion of the experimental work done in infectious disease research, it poses extraordinary potential risks to the public. |
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CRS, DrPH
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arirish
Admin Group Joined: June 19 2013 Location: Arkansas Status: Offline Points: 39215 |
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Thank You, Chuck! It's was nice to have the pros and cons laid out in such a reasoned fashion! In light of the recent mishaps at the CDC and NIH finding forgotten vials of small pox, ricin and plague in an old lab storage room, I think it's a good idea for everyone to step back, take a deep breath and examine safety and security protocols on all levels! Thanks to you and all the "Cambridge Working Group"!
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