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Tony SNow: Bird Flu in Michigan On Foxnew

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Topic: Tony SNow: Bird Flu in Michigan On Foxnew
Posted By: Guests
Subject: Tony SNow: Bird Flu in Michigan On Foxnew
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:23am
White house briefing on fox news as we speak.  Just mentioned bird flu found in Michigan swans.  Think it is low path, but not sure.  Will have an agriculture briefing in a few minutes.



Replies:
Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:27am
Will people even hear this? Time will tell but we should know soon enough.

I thought it would freak me out to hear that it is here. I am so glad that I have this forum, surely without it I would have. Thanks all for your information. We are ready, let's help the others.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:28am
Again, he said they think it is low path.  Still waiting to hear from the agriculture briefing coming up.
 
Made my heart skip a beat too


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:47am
Had to switch to CSPAN to watch the briefing.  Hopefully, the clinton/gates live coverage won't pre-empt this story as did the former isreal prime minister story.
 
Anyone in Michigan that can provide local coverage??


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:57am

White House: Lesser bird flu may be here

Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in wild mute swans in Michigan - but it does not appear to be the worrisome, highly pathogenic strain, the White House announced Monday.

"They believe it is a strain of low pathogenicity, similar to strains that have been seen before in North America," White House spokesman Tony Snow said.

Testing is still being done to confirm the presence of the virus and its type, officials said.

Scientists had feared that the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu would reach North America sometime this year. Just last week, the U.S. expanded monitoring of wild migratory birds throughout the nation, to check for early warning signs.

However, health officials stress that the virus' appearance in wild birds would not be a public health crisis - especially if it were the less worrisome, low-pathogenic strain.

http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/living/health/15271318.htm - http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/living/health/15271318.htm


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:02am
Another report;

http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/living/health/15271318.htm




Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:02am
We knew it would get here eventually.  I am just glad that is being reported as H5N1 and that they are testing to see if it is High Path!


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:07am

 I live in Mich. and have a flock of free range chickens.....Where were these found !!!!!!!!  I live s.w. of Lansing 



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:11am


I  can only get local channels  WILX  (Lansing)   NO CABLE runs down this rural route  ...Computer is dial-up....Unhappy


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:12am
  MSNBC.com

Possible bird flu strain found in U.S.
White House: Virus found in wild swans in Michigan not likely deadly form
The Associated Press

Updated: 11:03 a.m. ET Aug 14, 2006
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WASHINGTON - Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in wild mute swans in Michigan —but it does not appear to be the worrisome, highly pathogenic strain, the White House announced Monday.

"They believe it is a strain of low pathogenicity, similar to strains that have been seen before in North America," White House spokesman Tony Snow said. Testing is still being done to confirm the presence of the virus and its type, officials said.

Scientists had feared that the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu would reach North America sometime this year. Just last week, the U.S. expanded monitoring of wild migratory birds throughout the nation, to check for early warning signs.

However, health officials stress that the virus' appearance in wild birds would not be a public health crisis -- especially if it were the less worrisome, low-pathogenic strain.

Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in wild mute swans in Michigan. Testing is still being done to confirm the presence of the virus and its type but health officials say it doesn't appear to be the highly pathogenic strain.

A White House spokesman says researchers think it's a strain that has been seen before in North America. Scientists had feared that the deadly H5N1 strain would reach North America sometime this year. Health officials stress that the virus' appearance in wild birds would not be a public health crisis.

© 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14344652/ - http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14344652/



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:19am
OK, last article I'll post as they all say about the same thing.  This one a little more.
 
I am so glad this story has taken off like wildfire!  It is all over every U.S. news outlet - within 15-30 min of first being reported.  Maybe there is hope after all.
 
 
 
 
Bird Flu Found in Michigan Swans


WASHINGTON (AP) -- Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in wild mute swans in Michigan -- but it does not appear to be the most worrisome, highly pathogenic strain, the White House announced Monday.

"They believe it is a strain of low pathogenicity, similar to strains that have been seen before in North America," White House spokesman Tony Snow said.

Testing is still being done to confirm the presence of the H5N1 virus and its type. Officials with the Agriculture and Interior departments were to announce details later Monday morning.

Scientists had feared that the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu would reach North America -- in birds -- sometime this year. Just last week, the U.S. expanded monitoring of wild migratory birds throughout the nation, to check for early warning signs.

However, health officials stress that the virus' appearance in wild birds would not be a public health crisis -- especially if it were the less worrisome, low-pathogenic strain.

The H5N1 virus has killed at least 138 people worldwide since it began ravaging Asian poultry stocks in late 2003. But virtually all caught the virus from close contact with sick birds or their droppings.

Health officials are closely watching H5N1's march around the globe for fear the virus eventually could mutate into a strain that could spread easily from person-to-person, possibly sparking a worldwide epidemic. No one knows how likely that is to happen, and specialists agree that the risk doesn't jump even if a few infected birds are found to have entered the U.S.

But if that happens, it could trigger additional security steps, especially to prevent wild birds from infecting U.S. poultry flocks, and more stringent monitoring.

Wild birds, especially waterfowl, carry a multitude of flu viruses -- and officials have repeatedly warned that this first batch of testing could produce a lot of false alarms.

Only confirmatory tests that will take several more days -- possibly up to 10 -- can tell whether a suspect bird really has H5N1 or some other harmless flu strain. If so, that testing also will confirm whether the virus is the so-called "high-pathogenic" version, the deadly type, or a so-called "low-pathogenic" version, a mild type not of concern for humans.

(Copyright 2006 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:32am

On the local news this a.m. there was a story about a foiled plot to blow up the mackinac bridge that connects  the upper penninsula to lower Mich.  big news day for us I guess


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:35am
This is an old article that outlines what procedures they will use for testing and reporting the resutls to the public.
 
AMES, Iowa ~ Agriculture Department prepares for bird flu testing
http://www.avianflutalk.com/forum_posts.asp?TID=8647&PN=1

AMES, Iowa (AP) - The government's elaborate network for diagnosing bird flu will eventually come down to a sprawling 640-acre campus in the Iowa countryside where strict security is the only hint of the crucial role scientists there could play in a national drama that the country hopes will never materialize.

The security and the elaborate protective clothing the Agriculture Department scientists wear - scrubs, coveralls, rubber boots, protective glasses, hairnets and gloves - looks like a made-for-TV disaster movie....."

"Samples will be shipped to a network of laboratories across the country for screening. If a sample contains evidence of the H5 virus, it then gets shipped to Ames, where tests are run over several days to determine if the infected bird carried the H5N1 strain.

First, virus from the sample is injected in bird eggs, which are tested five days later to determine whether it is one of 144 strains of bird flu or whether it is another disease such as Exotic Newcastle, which is harmless to humans but deadly to poultry.

If it contains bird flu, the sample is tested to determine whether it is H5N1 or another of the avian influenzas. Only those testing positive for H5N1 go to the lab with the caged chickens.

Eight of these birds, specially bred and disease-free, are injected with virus from the suspect sample. Perhaps within hours, certainly in two days, the birds will begin moving more slowly, perhaps hunching in the corner of the cage and no longer eating and drinking. Their wattles might turn from bright orange to blue.

"If you lose 75 percent of the chickens, or more, then it's high-path," said Brundaben Panigrahy, head of the lab's avian section, using scientists' shorthand for the lethal strain of Asian bird flu.

Although the test results will be announced publicly, likely by officials in Washington, Granger said this will not be a signal of a threat to humans."

Note by Jhetta:  It looks like they now think it is Low Path H5N1... they found Low Path H5N1 in Canada last August... lets hope that additional test's prove that it is indeed Low Path H5N1
 
Note... Low Path H5N1 has previously been found in the US.
 
 
White House: Lesser bird flu may be here
http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/living/health/15271318.htm - http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/living/health/15271318.htm
LAURAN NEERGAARD
Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in wild mute swans in Michigan - but it does not appear to be the most worrisome strain, the Bush administration announced Monday.

The birds might have the H5N1 virus - confirmatory tests are under way - but other tests have ruled out that it could be the highly pathogenic version of that virus that has ravaged poultry in many other countries, Agriculture Department officials said.

"This is not the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that has spread through much of other parts of the world," said Ron DeHaven, administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

"We do not believe this virus represents a risk to human health," he declared.



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:38am
Nuts,
 
I just got back last Saturday from vacationing in Lower Michigan! 


Posted By: Concerned Dad
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:41am
I live in Michigan, south of Lansing, Ill be watching this story closely.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:43am
What low strain are they talking about? I saw a few article on news now bird flu, but no mention of the low path strain. This is coming from the White House, so it seems important.  There are at 6 or more stories floating on the wires.
 
MedClinician -- can you get confirmation on the strain?
 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208262,00.html - http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208262,00.html
 
http://www.wchstv.com/newsroom/nnews/news1.shtml - http://www.wchstv.com/newsroom/nnews/news1.shtml


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:50am

Just called  to have my chickens picked up.  I told him why and he said Bird flu huh?  He's coming right over......They are a nice flock of 'dark cornish' from Mc Murray hatchery........My daughter is now confining them in  her portable dog pen......I'm glued to the computer...No need to kiss them goodbye....Cry      I don't think I'm over-reacting because I've been kicking this around for some time now...

Mary


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:52am

+++++



Posted By: Concerned Dad
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:54am
MaryR, Jackson here, were nearly neighbors


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:58am

I probably know you......If this isn't the  'real McCoy' it is at least  dry run of what's to come.....Glad to know you're nearby.....See you at Sam's....LOL   


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:59am
Well, I guess we won't have to worry about media coverage when it does get here.  It is being covered very well.  It is every other story on the news boards.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:21am
I thought H5NI was high path.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:28am
my feelings too, Angie.  I'm so glad they're reporting even low-path - maybe it will bring people back to the potential of a pandemic so that they can take precautions.  Don't blame you a bit for your move, Mary R. 
As we've seen, even the less lethal varieties can mutate overnight.


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:29am
No H5N1 is not always High Path.... it became High Path in Asia.... And is so far NOT High Path in North America.
 
 
http://www.michigan.gov/emergingdiseases/0,1607,7-186-25805-142944--,00.html - http://www.michigan.gov/emergingdiseases/0,1607,7-186-25805-142944--,00.html
"To date this High Path form of H5N1 Avian Influenza has not been found in the U.S. However, a Low Path strain of H5N1 was found on a Michigan poultry farm in 2002. At that time Michigan's State Veterinarian recommended the poultry flock be humanely destroyed as a safety precaution."
 
AVIAN INFLUENZA  
 
Low-Pathogenicity H5N1 vs. High-Pathogenicity H5N1
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2006/06/0224.xml - http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2006/06/0224.xml
 

 
June 2006
There are two types of avian influenza (AI) that are both identified as H5N1. A difference exists in the virus classification; one is low-pathogenicity (LPAI) and the other is high-pathogenicity (HPAI). Pathogenicity refers to the ability of the virus to produce disease.
HPAI H5N1, often referred to as the "Asian" H5N1, is the type causing worldwide concern. LPAI H5N1, often referred to as the "North American" H5N1, is less concerning. Following is an explanation of the differences between them.
 
LPAI H5N1 ("North American" H5N1)
LPAI, or "low path" AI, naturally occurs in wild birds and can spread to domestic birds. In most cases, it causes minor symptoms. It is rarely fatal in birds. These strains of the virus are not a human health concern. This includes LPAI H5N1.
 
Evidence of LPAI H5N1 has been found on two occasions in wild birds in the United States in recent years. In 1975, LPAI H5N1 was detected in a wild duck and in 1986, it was detected in a wild mallard. These detections occurred as part of routine sampling, not as a result of noticeable illness in the birds. These LPAI H5N1 strains are not closely related to the more severe HPAI H5N1 circulating overseas.
 
HPAI H5N1 ("Asian" H5N1)
HPAI, or "high path" AI, spreads rapidly and is often fatal to chickens and turkeys. This includes HPAI H5N1. Millions of birds have died in countries where HPAI H5N1 has been detected. This virus has also infected people, most of whom have had direct contact with infected birds.
HPAI H5N1 has not been detected in the United States. However, other strains of HPAI have been detected and eradicated three times in the United States: in 1924, 1983 and 2004. No significant human illness resulted from these outbreaks.
 
TERMINOLOGY
Avian influenza (AI)--the bird flu--is a virus that infects wild birds (such as ducks, gulls, and shorebirds) and domestic poultry (such as chickens, turkeys, ducks, and geese). There is flu for birds just as there is for humans and, as with people, some forms of the flu in birds are worse than others.
 
AI viruses are classified by a combination of two groups of proteins: the hemagglutinin or H proteins, of which there are 16 (H1-H16), and neuraminidase or N proteins, of which there are 9 (N1-N9).
 
Pathogenicity: the ability of the virus to produce disease. AI strains also are divided into two groups based upon the ability of the virus to produce disease: low pathogenic (LP) and highly pathogenic (HP).
 
Low Pathogenic or "low path" avian influenza (LPAI): LPAI occurs naturally in wild birds and can spread to domestic birds. In most cases it causes no signs of infection or only minor symptoms in birds. These strains of the disease pose little significant threat to human health. These strains are common in the U.S. and around the world.
 
Highly Pathogenic or "high path" avian influenza (HPAI): HPAI is often fatal in chickens and turkeys. HPAI spreads rapidly and has a high death rate in birds than LPAI. HPAI has been detected and eradicated three times in U.S. domestic poultry. HPAI H5N1 is the subtype rapidly spreading in some parts of the world.
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:34am
Release No. 0294.06
Contact:
USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623
DOI Press Office (202) 208-6416
 
CONFIRMATORY TESTS BEING CONDUCTED ON MICHIGAN WILD BIRD SAMPLES

WASHINGTON, August, 14, 2006-The U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Interior today announced that routine surveillance has indicated the presence of H5 and N1 avian influenza subtypes in samples from two wild mute swans in Michigan, but testing has ruled out the possibility of this being the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain that has spread through birds in Asia, Europe and Africa. Test results thus far indicate this is low pathogenicity avian influenza, which poses no threat to human health.

The swans were sampled as part of the expanded avian influenza surveillance program. They were showing no signs of sickness, which suggests that this is low pathogenicity avian influenza. Additionally, genetic analysis of the virus conducted at USDA's National Veterinary Services laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, suggests that it is similar to a low pathogenicity strain that has been found in North America.

It is possible that these birds were not infected with an H5N1 strain, but instead with two separate avian influenza viruses, one containing H5 and the other containing N1. The confirmatory testing underway at NVSL will clarify whether one or more strains of the virus are present, the specific subtype, as well as pathogenicity. These results are expected within two weeks and will be made public when completed. It should be noted that wild birds are known to harbor many influenza viruses, and the finding of one or more of these viruses during routine testing is not unusual.

The swans were sampled August 8 at the Mouillee state game area located on the coast of Lake Erie in Monroe County, Michigan. The samples were taken by USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service personnel as part of an expanded wild bird monitoring program. The Departments of Agriculture and Interior are working collaboratively with States to sample wild birds throughout the United States for the presence of highly pathogenic avian influenza.

Initial screening tests on the swan samples were conducted by Michigan State University's Diagnostic Center for Population and Animal Health--part of USDA's National Animal Health Laboratory Network. These tests indicated the presence of an H5 avian influenza virus. Confirmatory testing at NVSL confirmed the H5 and the N1. This testing also suggests, but has not yet confirmed, that this is low pathogenicity avian influenza.

Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) commonly occurs in wild birds, where it typically causes only minor symptoms or no noticeable symptoms. These strains of the virus are not a human health concern. This includes LPAI H5N1, commonly referred to as the North American H5N1. This strain of low pathogenicity avian influenza is very different from the more severe HPAI H5N1 circulating overseas, which is commonly referred to as the Asian H5N1.

Evidence of LPAI H5N1 has been found on two occasions in wild birds in the United States. In 1975 and 1986, it was detected in wild ducks. These detections occurred as part of routine sampling. LPAI H5N1 has also been detected in Canada, most recently in 2005.

For more information, visit http://www.usda.gov/birdflu - http://www.usda.gov/birdflu or http://www.avianflu.gov/ - http://www.avianflu.gov .

FACT SHEET: http://www.usda.gov/2006/08/0296.xml - Low-Pathogenicity H5N1 vs. High-Pathogenicity H5N1

FACT SHEET: http://www.usda.gov/2006/06/0223.xml - Avian Influenza Testing And Diagnostics

http://www.usda.gov/birdflu - USDA Bird Flu Information

http://www.pandemicflu.gov/ - PandemicFlu.gov & Avian Flu.gov


#


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:41am
I fibbedEmbarrassed One more article - just because it is a local report out of Michigan.
 
 
Article published Aug 14, 2006
BREAKING NEWS:
Pointe Mouillee swans checked for bird flu strain


Two mute swans found in Monroe County have a virus related to the bird flu that has swept parts of Asia, but officials don't believe the discovery represents any threat to human health.

The birds were two among 20 that were sampled at the Pointe Mouillee State Game Area last week. Further testing is under way, but the virus found is believed to be a low pathogenic strain "and not known to produce any illness in people," said Dr. Ron DeHaven, a United States Department of Agriculture administrator.

"This is not the virus found in Asia or other parts of the world - that we can say for certain," Dr. DeHaven said.

A highly pathogenic version of the H5N1 strain resulted in the deaths of millions of birds and hundreds of people in parts of China and Asia.

Dr. DeHaven also said the strain carried by the Pointe Mouillee swans is believed to be that found in the United States in 1975 and in Manitoba, Canada, last year and is not known to produce illness in people.

Federal and state officials have stepped up their waterfowl monitoring programs since the Asian bird flu scare in hopes of finding early evidence of the disease if it migrates to this country. They discussed the Pointe Mouillee swan discovery during a press conference this morning because the H5 strains can mutate rapidly.

But Dr. DeHaven said there's no evidence yet that the virus found is a threat to poultry.

"The finding of this virus in wild birds should be no basis for any country imposing trade restrictions," he said.

He said the virus was found in genetic tests on birds taken during a thinning of the mute swan population at Pointe Mouillee. It was pinpointed at a screening lab at Michigan State University, and the swans with the virus now are undergoing more tests at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa.

The plan there is to inoculate eight chicks with the swan virus. If six or more die within 10 days, the strain might be categorized as a high pathogenic virus. The results might be known in two weeks.

Meantime, he said there's no cause for health officials to take any steps in response to the discovery.

Pointe Mouillee, in Berlin Township on the Lake Erie shore, is a 3,000-acre marsh that's part of the migratory path for waterfowl, birds of prey, songbirds and about 75,000 shorebirds.
http://www.monroenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20060814&Category=NEWS01&ArtNo=108140020&SectionCat=&Template=printart - http://www.monroenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20060814&Category=NEWS01&ArtNo=108140020&SectionCat=&Template=printart


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:48am

Thanks  Sand,  That takes a major worry off me for now........

I need to focus on the family now that I have them  all wound up..  Wacko    Wacko


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:58am

Your welcome, MaryR.  I've been rather transfixed by this whole thing this morning.  First with China, now here.

What a way to spend the first day of no kids/start of school year!  I has been a distraction at least...I miss my kidsCry

 

 



Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 9:58am
Part of the National Response Plan is to send all suspected H5N1 birds for testing in Ames.  They are currently testing for High Path in Ames.
 
Originally posted by Sand Sand wrote:

"The finding of this virus in wild birds should be no basis for any country imposing trade restrictions," he said.

He said the virus was found in genetic tests on birds taken during a thinning of the mute swan population at Pointe Mouillee.
 
It was pinpointed at a screening lab at Michigan State University, and the swans with the virus now are undergoing more tests at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa.

The plan there is to inoculate eight chicks with the swan virus. If six or more die within 10 days, the strain might be categorized as a high pathogenic virus. The results might be known in two weeks.

Meantime, he said there's no cause for health officials to take any steps in response to the discovery.

Pointe Mouillee, in Berlin Township on the Lake Erie shore, is a 3,000-acre marsh that's part of the migratory path for waterfowl, birds of prey, songbirds and about 75,000 shorebirds.
http://www.monroenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20060814&Category=NEWS01&ArtNo=108140020&SectionCat=&Template=printart - http://www.monroenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20060814&Category=NEWS01&ArtNo=108140020&SectionCat=&Template=printart


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 10:05am
Our FIRST blinking chickenCryCryCry
 

Biologycal Hazard - North-America

Event summary
http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/glide_referency.php?lang=eng - GLIDE Number BH-20060814-7163-USA    
Event type Biologycal Hazard Date / time 14/08/2006 - 18:53:35 (Military Time, UTC)
Country USA Area Lake Erie
County / State Michigan City -
Cause of event Unknow Log date 14/08/2006 - 18:53:35 (Military Time, UTC)
Damage level Not or Not data Time left
Latitude: N 41° 49.140 Longitude: W 83° 10.103
Number of deaths: Not or Not data Number of injured persons: Not or Not data
Evacuated: - Infected -
-

DESCRIPTION
Scientists have discovered the possible presence of bird flu in the United States -- in wild swans near the banks of Lake Erie -- but it does not appear to be the worrisome strain that the government has long feared. Routine tests on two seemingly healthy wild mute swans in Michigan suggest they might have the H5N1 virus; confirmatory tests are under way. But other testing has ruled out that it could the so-called highly pathogenic version of that virus that has ravaged poultry in Asia, and killed at least 138 people worldwide, the Agriculture Department announced Monday. "This is not the highly pathogenic avian influence virus that has spread through much of other parts of the world," said Ron DeHaven, administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. "We do not believe this virus represents a risk to human health," he declared.
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Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 10:22am
Thanks Jhetta for the clarification.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 10:35am

Sand ,

Don't feel too bad, in just a few short hours they'll be flying in with armloads of forms to fill out for school.....I miss those days...Unhappy


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 10:53am
I thought low path can turn into high path if It isnt contained????


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 10:58am
To some extent, I'm getting mixed signals from these reports today. They say that the H5N1 is not high-path, yet they are doing more tests to verify. However, in the same report they say that they have ruled out H5N1 high path. Which is it? If it takes two weeks to conduct the tests, have they not completed those tests yet.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 11:07am
Here is some information on avian influenza viruses from the CDC.
 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-influenza.htm - http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-influenza.htm
 
 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/flu-viruses.htm - http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/flu-viruses.htm


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 11:11am
LPAI viruses have the potential to evolve into HPAI viruses and this has been documented in some poultry outbreaks.


http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-influenza.htm


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 11:17am
I didn't see/read the news briefing so cannot determine the tone of how all this was presented, but a big question I have is why is there a briefing about this low-path version, which has been in the U.S. before?  Why do we need to be briefed about something that poses no threat to humans or birds?  With everything in the world going on this seems strange unless they already know it is high path or seem to think there is a good chance the follow up tests could show it ... someone please talk me thru this, I can;t get it out of my mind why they would brief on something innnocuous unless they are trying to break this to us gently in stages.Confused


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 11:25am
Well, to clarify, this was the general daily white house briefing with the press.  They primarily covered Isreal and Lebanon.   The briefing was definately not strictly related to Michigan.
 
Tony Snow just kind of threw it out there as in  Oh, by the way, you'll be hearing about this soon in the news and there will be an Ag briefing in a moment on the subject .
 
He didn't say anything else about it that I saw, but I was in and out of the room so not for sure on that.
 
As for what it means, not sure, but am glad they are keeping us informed.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 12:23pm
Does anybody else find it odd that the determination of High path will be made by the death of 6/10 chicks or a 60% mortality? 
 
Truly I don't know anything about the virus in birds.  I must assume that they are making reasonable choices.  It just seems like the death of 5/10 chicks would also be significant...
 
gardener


Posted By: Mahshadin
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 12:52pm
So there is HPAI and LPAI with from what I can tell a very generalized description.
 
Exactly what in terms of Verolgy Testing would determine the difference, does anyone know????? 
 
Or are they just clueless and waiting for birds to die before thaey say its HPAI.
 
Does anyone one know the exact location where the birds were tested?????


-------------
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act."   G Orwell


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 1:39pm
< name=deion value="Tran of USDA and DOI Avian Influenza Media Briefing. Tran of USDA and DOI Avian Influenza Media Briefing"> < name=creater value="APHIS"> < name="date created" value="2006-08-14"> < name="date reviewed" value="2006-08-14"> < name=keywords value="Avian Influenza"> < name= value="EN"> < name=agency value="APHIS"> < name=at value="text/"> var lastmoddate = "Last Modified: 08/14/2006" ;
Release No. 0297.06
Contact:
Press Office (202)720-4623
 
Transcript of USDA and DOI Avian Influenza Media Briefing August 14, 2006 - Washington, D.C.

MS. TERRI TEUBER: Good morning, everyone. This morning we'd like to provide an update on the Wild Bird Monitoring Program being conducted as an interagency project. With us today to offer some comments are Dr. Ron DeHaven, the administrator of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; Dr. Sue Haseltine, associate director for Biology at the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. Geological Survey; and Dr. Bill Raub, science advisor to the Secretary at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

If you'd like spelling on any of those names, I'd be happy to assist you with those afterwards.

And with that, I'm going to turn it over to Dr. Ron DeHaven.

DR. RON DEHAVEN: Thank you, Terri. Routine surveillance testing has indicated the possible presence of H5N1 avian influenza subtypes in wild mute swans in the state of Michigan. Testing has ruled out the possibility that this is the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus that has spread through much of Asia, Europe and Africa. And I want to repeat that. This is not the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that has spread through much of other parts of the world.

Further, we do not believe that this virus represents a risk to human health.

Genetic analysis of this particular virus indicates that it's similar to low pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza strains that have been found previously in North America. The fact that these swans showed no signs of sickness and there was no sign of disease in birds around them further suggests that we are dealing with a low pathogenic avian influenza virus.

Final confirmation of its pathogenicity will be made and reported when that testing is completed.

Let me explain that pathogenicity simply refers to the ability of a virus to produce disease. Thus, a low-pathogenic virus produces much less disease and mortality in birds that are affected than highly pathogenic viruses would.

Low pathogenic strains of the virus furthermore typically are of no human health concern, and this would include the low pathogenic H5N1 virus that has been found in wild birds previously in North America.

In fact there's another possibility with regard to this particular situation, and that is that these birds are not infected with an H5N1 virus at all; but instead they could be infected with two separate avian influenza viruses, one contributing the H5 component and the second virus contributing the N1 component. Further testing will determine whether or not that is the case.

Even if that is the case, this would not change our assessment relative to the low risk associated with this particular finding. These mute swans were resident wild birds, not migratory birds, and we have no reason to believe those birds that were positive had any connection with any commercial poultry. Again, these were wild birds, and we have no reason to believe that any commercial poultry have been exposed to these particular swans.

Confirmatory testing is continuing at the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, and this testing will determine the exact subtypes of the virus and confirm its pathogenicity, whether it's a highly pathogenic or a low pathogenic virus.

These results are expected within two weeks time, and we will make them public when they become available.

We are providing information about the sampling even though there is little reason for concern because of our commitment to transparency in the testing process.

I may also take this opportunity to give some background on avian influenza viruses in general. AI viruses are in the same family of viruses that produce flu in humans every year. AI viruses can infect chickens, turkeys, pheasants, quail, ducks, geese, guinea fowl, as well as a number of other birds including wild migratory fowl.

Worldwide there are literally hundreds of avian influenza viruses, each of which can produce varying degrees of illness in poultry. We typically characterize these viruses based on two proteins that are found on the surface of the virus. One is referred to as a hemagglutinin protein or H protein, and the other a neuraminidase or simply N protein.

There are 16 different H subtypes, 9 different N subtypes; so you have a combination of 144 different characterizations of this virus based on the particular H and N types.

The virus that's currently circulating in much of the rest of the world -- that is in fact highly pathogenic in poultry and is capable of producing disease in humans -- is by this characterization an H5N1 highly pathogenic virus. But I think it's important to point out that viruses within that same subtyping can be very different. So, for example, you can have two distinctly different H7N2 viruses, and as is the case with the H5N1 we have two distinctly different H5N1 viruses -- the highly pathogenic form that is producing disease in poultry and in some cases in humans in much of the rest of the world, and this North American H5N1 virus that heretofore has been low pathogenic in birds and is not known to produce any disease in people.

So not all viruses are created equal, even those that would have the same characterization such as an H5N1 are not always the same.

Because of increased disease surveillance testing that we are doing in wild birds in the United States, and given the number of avian influenza viruses out there, it is certainly not unexpected that we would find a number of low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses including an H5N1 virus that we know has been circulating before in wild birds in North America. In fact, this low-pathogenic H5N1 virus has been found on two occasions in wild birds in North America. These were in wild ducks in the U.S. in 1975, and 1986, and more recently late last year in Manitoba, Canada.

I should point out too that according to the International Standards put out by the OIE, or the World Organization for Animal Health, finding of this virus in wild birds should be no basis for any country imposing trade restrictions on the United States and our commercial poultry.

A little bit of additional information about this particular Michigan situation-- the samples in question were collected as part of our routine surveillance program on Tuesday, August 8, and they were collected by some our Wildlife Services employees within the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of USDA. The samples were collected at Point Mouillee, which is a game area in Monroe County, Michigan, which is found in the southeastern tip of the state of Michigan.

Screening tests on these samples were conducted at the Diagnostic Center for Population Animal Health at Michigan State University on August 9, and when they came back with positive results for H5 those samples were then forwarded to our National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, where confirmatory testing began on August 12.

It was those screening tests originally conducted at the laboratory at Michigan State University that indicated that these birds had been exposed to H5 avian influenza viruses.

With that, let me turn the microphone over to Dr. Sue Haseltine from the U.S. Geological Survey at Department of Interior where she is the associate director for Biology, to give an Interior perspective on this situation. Sue?

DR. SUE HASELTINE: Well, thanks, Ron, and good morning, everyone. I guess from Interior's perspective I'd like to bring you up to date a little bit on the sampling that we're doing in wild birds across the country for avian influenza. As Ron has said, this finding of an H5N1 is not a surprising event to us even though it's in a wildlife species of a resident mute swan. And in fact we have been increasing our surveillance for all avian influenza subtypes throughout wildlife species in this country as sort of an early warning system for this particular strain in Asia.

And just to give you a sampling of that, in Interior we have tested so far over 8,000 samples from migratory birds in this country since early June. About 4,000 of those are from subsistence hunters in Alaska-- the subsistence hunt in the spring harvests all kinds of migratory birds as they return from their wintering grounds to breed, many of them from Asia. And then about 4,000 additional samples have been run on live birds that we know have a life history of spending time in Asia during the wintering months of their life cycle.

In that sampling as a whole, we found less than 2 percent of them to have contained avian influenza viruses of any subtype, and that's about standard for what we would find sampling wildlife species across the country. We tend to find a bimodal distribution in avian influenza viruses. They tend to build up and we find more when we sample in the fall.

But we're about on point, and we are continuing to sample both live birds as they return, especially to the Pacific Flyway and the Pacific Islands, and as I said the spring subsistence hunt.

We've also increased our capability to detect mortality events around the country, and Interior as a whole has responded to about 18 large-scale wildlife mortality events since early June, and none of those have been caused by avian influenza. But that's another increased surveillance that we, and the states, are all looking out for.

DR. DEHAVEN: Thank you, Sue. I think this points out an important thing. It is certainly no surprise that we're here this morning given the level of surveillance that we're doing in wild birds and knowing what we know about the prevalence of avian influenza in those species. It's really not surprising that we have found this particular virus. Certainly we will continue the testing that would be relevant in terms of characterization of this virus. But again the fact that we're here this morning reporting this is certainly no surprise given the volume of testing that we're doing as part of our overall highly pathogenic AI program in the U.S.

And I have to say, too, that it is, I think, a model of cooperation in that some of the testing is being carried out by Department of Interior, some by Department of Agriculture, and much of it by our colleagues in the State Departments of Natural Resources and Game and Fish.

With that, let me turn the microphone over to Dr. Bill Raub who's the science advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for a human health perspective. Bill?

DR. BILL RAUB: Thank you, Ron. I appreciate the opportunity to join you this morning. I reinforce Dr. DeHaven's point that the evidence accumulating here suggests no threat to human health. We see no cause for public health and medical authorities to take any special actions as a result of this information.

We are dealing by all evidence with a matter of wildlife biology. From the perspective of Health and Human Services, we very much appreciate the initiatives of our colleagues in the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior for mounting and operating this wildlife surveillance activity.

We appreciate our partnership with them. The response here demonstrates the smooth and effective capabilities and coordination amongst the agencies and augers well should there be the time when a somewhat more troublesome set of information emerges than we have as of now.

All of our agencies have offered a variety of general precautions with respect to such things as dealing with sick and dying animals, which is not the case here; precautions with respect to workplace exposures such as in handling sick and dying animals, which is not the case here but we remain vigilant and prepared.

And again, I appreciate the initiative of our two colleague cabinet departments. Thank you.

DR. DEHAVEN: With that we would like to open it up for your questions and would only ask that you get a microphone before you ask your question.

REPORTER: Dr. DeHaven, Bill Tomson, Dow Jones. You've said before, and correct me if I'm wrong, that low-path can evolve into high path. Is that the case here? Is this something you're concerned about this evolving into a highly pathogenic strain?

DR. DEHAVEN: One of the characteristics about influenza viruses in general is their ability to mutate and mutate quickly, and it's really for that reason that the flu shot that you obtained last year won't protect you from the flu viruses that we'll encounter next year or the year after. It's no different in birds. In fact, these viruses do mutate quickly.

It's only the H5 and H7 subtypes, low pathogenic H5 and H7 subtypes, that have ever been known to mutate into a highly pathogenic form. So the fact that we are dealing here with what looks like a low pathogenic H5 virus would be reason for concern simply because any H5 or H7 virus has that potential.

But let me emphasize again the fact that there is no known exposure of these birds to commercial poultry, and we also know that again wild bird populations have a number of different avian influenza viruses out there. So this is no surprise. We've known that there's been an H5N1 low-pathogenic virus circulating in wild birds in this country for a number of years. So not a surprise. But again, any H5 or H7 virus is of concern from a commercial standpoint in that it has the potential to mutate to a highly pathogenic form.

In the back?

REPORTER: Irv Chapman. I work for Bloomberg. First a factual question. We heard that 8,000 birds have been tested by Interior. Is there an overall number for how many birds have been tested this season and nationwide?

And second, how did this particular swan get the virus or get sick -- or if it's not sick, just get the virus?

DR. DEHAVEN: Let me take the second question first in terms of how this bird might have gotten the virus and its clinical symptoms and turn over to Dr. Haseltine to talk about the numbers of testing.

Again I think it's important to emphasize that these avian influenza viruses are in our wild population. In fact wild birds serve as the reservoir, the ongoing source of virus for avian influenza viruses. So it's not surprising. And in some species of birds the birds are completely healthy and normal, as was the case here. These birds were sampled as part of our routine surveillance program. There was no morbidity or mortality associated with these birds at the time that they were tested.

So what we have are healthy, normal-appearing birds that appear to have been carrying a low pathogenic virus as best we can tell at this point in time.

I mentioned that the cooperative effort between Department of Interior and USDA in carrying out this wild bird surveillance program, Dr. Haseltine mentioned some 8,000 samples collected thus far by Department of Interior-- our USDA APHIS Wildlife Services colleagues thus far have collected in the neighborhood of 2,000 to 3,000 samples. But let me defer to Sue for some more definitive information.

DR. HASELTINE: I think the answer is, we can't really tell in the samples yet because in addition to federal efforts there are also state efforts and university efforts going on. And I guess this would be a good time to put a plug in for our joint information systems, which are being prototyped at the moment. And by this fall, we have a commitment from the whole community to deposit their information in those. And we should, in a much more rapid way by September or October, be able to give you a total that have been tested and where those are. But I'm sorry I can't do that right now.

DR. DEHAVEN: It's important to point out too that while we've been doing a lot of testing in Alaska, because those are the nesting and breeding grounds where these birds are now, we'll be doing a lot of testing in the lower 48 throughout the United States beginning in late August through September and the fall migration season. So much of the testing in the rest of the country will begin late August and continue on through the fall.

Yes, ma'am?

REPORTER: Salli Kidd with Hearst TV. What is happening with the birds that tested positive? Are you destroying them?

DR. DEHAVEN: We actually -- it's a unique situation with these particular mute swans in that they are a species of swan that was introduced in the area and as Dr. Haseltine pointed out they are actually residents in this game area in Monroe County. Because of the overpopulation of mute swans and because of the fact that they compete better than some of the native species of birds -- for example the trumpeter swan as well as loons -- we actually had a contract in APHIS with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources to decrease the population of these particular species of birds.

So the animals that were tested were actually part of that reduction in population effort, and we're just taking good advantage of that fact in collecting samples from those birds that are being sacrificed. So these birds in fact were sacrificed and then samples collected from them. Again, there are many more of these species, these mute swans, in that game area. And there is no evidence of any mortality or morbidity, no sickness or dying in that population of birds.

Yes, sir -- gentleman in the yellow shirt?

REPORTER: -- Bridges, Associated Press. Could you explain a little bit the scene, what other bird species are present in this preserve? Have you stepped up testing of those species? Numbers of birds that are there? And also, what might have been the source of the virus? Was it something, was it indeed a reservoir? Is it something that may have recently arrived carried by migratory birds? Just if you could explain a little bit the mechanics.

DR. DEHAVEN: Let me ask Dr. Haseltine to take that.

DR. HASELTINE: Well, I can only give you a general answer to that question. I don't know the specifics. But you know mute swans are a wetlands species as they are around here, so you would expect to have shore birds, waterfowl, and it's a semi-forested area so raptures and passerine birds in the area.

As far as how the virus might have gotten there, as Dr. DeHaven said we've found this virus, this particular strain of the virus, in several other wetlands situations around the U.S. and Canada over the last 20 years, and no doubt this virus is cycled through feces and what not. So that would be my best guess as to how these particular birds picked it up.

REPORTER: To follow up, wouldn't this maybe establish a precedent for the high path mode where it could have made it to these shores? Or as you suggested is it something that perhaps has been present in the background?

DR. HASELTINE: I think it's present in the background in this country and in Canada and cycles -- you know mute swans are an introduced species that while they tend to be fairly resident they move back and forth with weather fronts in open water and all kinds of migratory species then use the same wetlands that they do. So it makes sense to me that this is not a precedent. It's just a normal avian influenza event.

DR. DEHAVEN: Let me clarify with three points. One, we can definitively say this is not the H5N1 virus, highly pathogenic virus that's been found in Asia and other parts of the world. That we know for certain, so it's not the introduction of that virus into North America.

Secondly, we do have reports of a number of different species of birds in this game area, various species of ducks, loons, other types of swans. So there's a number of different species.

And the third point is that we will be coordinating with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources to do additional testing in those species of birds in this particular game area.

But again, not surprising that we would find avian influenza viruses in our native population of wild birds. We know they are the reservoir, and we also know that there's been a low pathogenic H5N1 virus circulating in North America. So here again no surprise that we just happened to find it in this particular area.

Gentleman in the blue shirt?

REPORTER: Scott Foster with NBC News. How many birds tested positive?

DR. DEHAVEN: The samples were collected from 20 birds and two of the 20 tested positive.

Next question? Next, ma'am.

REPORTER: Jane Zhang of the Wall Street Journal. The tests you are conducting in Iowa right now, are they going to be different from the ones you conducted in Michigan and the [inaudible]?

DR. DEHAVEN: There's a number of tests that we run on any of these samples. We have a network of over 50 laboratories, most of them state diagnostic laboratories, state veterinary diagnostic laboratories that are doing the screening test for us. They are doing what's called the PCR, polymerase chain reaction test, which looks for the genetic material of the virus. So that's a screening test that's being carried out at this laboratory at Michigan State as well as the other laboratories in our National Animal Health Laboratory network.

If any of those laboratories find an H5 or an H7 virus, again because of the potential for the H5 and H7 subtypes to mutate to a highly pathogenic virus, those samples then go to our National Reference Laboratory, which is the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa.

When samples are received there, as they were in this case, we repeat that PCR testing for H5 and H7. We also do a PCR testing to determine whether or not it's an N1 test. And so it's those two PCR tests conducted in Ames that show that we have the antigens compatible with an H5 and N1.

The additional testing that we're doing would include sequencing the genetic material. What is the sequence of the genes, and is that consistent with a North American strain or an Asian strain? The fact that this was compatible with our North American virus and not compatible with the Asian high path avian influenza virus that we are able to say that this is not the incursion of that Asian high path H5N1 virus.

There's also another test to determine pathogenicity or really two ways to determine pathogenicity. One is, looking at that sequence, that gene sequence. It's through that gene sequence testing that we're able to say that from a genetic standpoint this looks like a low pathogenic virus.

But the other test that we run involves inoculating baby chickens, eight baby chickens with this virus and then the test is that if six or more of those baby chickens die within a 10-day period then it would be characterized as a highly pathogenic virus.

So we're just starting that work. We have to grow more virus before we can inoculate it into the baby chickens. And so we're estimating it could take us upwards of two weeks before we would have that second test done that determines pathogenicity.

So two pathogenicity tests, one that looks at the gene sequence, one that looks at the impact on baby chickens. Either one or both that came back highly pathogenic, we would be bound to call this a highly pathogenic virus. The first test is done, indicates a low path virus. The results from that second test which should be forthcoming in the next two weeks.

Next question, please?

Very good. I see no other hands. We appreciate your time and attention. Again, we'll continue this testing that's being done on these samples, and as we get the additional results we'll certainly make them public to you.

Terri?

MS. TEUBER: I will just add that you should have packets that have both the news release about what has just been discussed, a fact sheet that compares low path H5N1 to high path H5N1. I know that's a little bit confusing, so hopefully that will help to clarify that. And also a fact sheet about our testing procedures because that too is somewhat complicated, and that sort of walks you through step-by-step what tests are conducted and where.

For those not present listening via telephone or on the web, all this information will also be posted on the USDA website.

Thanks everyone.


#


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 1:41pm
This from the Pandemicflu.gov site.
 
The webcast from the briefing.
 
  mms://ocbmtcwmp.usda.gov./content/secy/secy081406a.wmv - Archived Webcast >>


Posted By: Pegasus
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 2:09pm
     I am glad that this incident was brought up at the the daily briefing.   Had they NOT mentioned it, there would no doubt be talk of 'cover-up and conspiracy' abounding.  Before rumors get out of hand, it's best to stand up and say, "Yes, this is what is going on.  We know many (some?) of you are concerned about AI (or any other potential pandemic situation) in light of what is happening in other parts of the world.  Here is what we have found so far..." 
     It is an uncomfortable truth to hear a reminder that any type of H5N1 is in the US but blissful ignorance will not aid in my (or your) preparations.   Sure wish Ed McMahon would pull through with that big check so I could prep in the manner to which I would like to become accustomed if need be.  You know, large propane tank, generators, independent wealth so I can move back to the old farm of childhood.  Alas, reality rears its head yet again.  At least I have wind-up flashlights and radios for comfort while I eat my pop top cans of beans and fruit.  Smile
    
 


-------------
     "We do not know the true value of moments until they have undergone the test of memory."   unknown author


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 2:18pm
I found this on-line and thought it was interesting.
 

Laboratory in Madison Testing Migratory Bird Samples for Bird Flu

May 25, 2006 : 12:00 AM
The US Geological Survey Lab in Madison, Wisconsin may be the first to know if the bird flu has hit the United Sates. They are testing fecal samples of migratory birds from the shoreline of the Alaskan coast. Many miratory birds use the Alaskan coast as an entry point to the country. The lab expects about 1300 samples to arrive over the next few days.

While other government labs are doing testing as well, the nature of the samples is such that the Wisconsin lab may the first to spot the disease. "If we find an H5 or H7 positive, it's been decided we will send it immediately to the National Veterinary Services Lab in Ames, Iowa," says Paul Slota. The Iowa lab will then confirm whether or not the virus has entered the country.

News of a positive test in Iowa would likely come out of Washington in a joint announcement from several government agencies.

http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com/ - http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com
May 24, 2006




Posted By: Mahshadin
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 2:19pm
From above comments_________________________________________________
 
In fact there's another possibility with regard to this particular situation, and that is that these birds are not infected with an H5N1 virus at all; but instead they could be infected with two separate avian influenza viruses, one contributing the H5 component and the second virus contributing the N1 component. Further testing will determine whether or not that is the case._______________________________________________________
 
WOW thats reassuring!!! Sounds like the testing used needs a major upgrade if you ask me. They dont know if its one or two virus samples in the results???? So what he is saying is it could be
H5N2
&
H7N1
and there test cant distinguish the difference?????
 
 


-------------
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act."   G Orwell


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 2:25pm
Anharra just posted a great thread in the discussion forum addressing some of our questions here.
 
http://www.avianflutalk.com/forum_posts.asp?TID=11442 - H5N1s are not created equal


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 2:42pm


INFLUENZA >>  http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/index.html - AVIAN INFLUENZA  >>  http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/index.html - NEWS  >> 

Two Michigan swans have avian flu; experts quell concerns

Lisa Schnirring * Contributing Writer

Aug 14, 2006 (CIDRAP News) –The federal government announced today that two swans in Michigan tested positive for both the H5 and N1 avian influenza subtypes, but initial genetic sequencing suggests that it is a low-pathogenic type rather than the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain spreading through birds in Asia, Europe, and Africa and causing deaths in humans.

Ron DeHaven, chief veterinary officer for the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), said at a media briefing today that the birds appeared healthy and normal and were part of a group of 20 nonmigratory, resident mute swans that were sacrificed and tested on Aug 8 as part of a population reduction plan at a game area on Lake Erie in southeast Michigan.

Bill Raub, science advisor to the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, said the findings should not cause alarm. "There is no threat to human health, and there is no cause for any special actions," he said. "This is a matter of wildlife biology."

On Aug 9 the samples were tested at Michigan State University's Diagnostic Center for Population and Animal Health, part of the USDA's National Animal Health Laboratory Network, where tests confirmed the presence of an H5 avian influenza virus. The samples were then sent to the USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, which is the only national reference laboratory that can confirm the H5N1 virus.

Confirmatory tests at the NVSL lab showed the presence of an H5 virus along with an N1 subtype; however, experts aren't sure if the birds were infected with two separate avian influenza strains or if the findings represent low-pathogenic H5N1. Testing began at the NVSL on Aug 12 to further characterize the virus, and results are expected in about 2 weeks.

An analysis of genetic sequences at the NVSL has already suggested that the avian influenza virus in the swans is similar to the low-pathogenic avian flu virus identified previously in North America. Routine sampling in wild ducks in the United States showed evidence of low-pathogenic H5N1 in 1975 and 1986. The virus has also been detected in Canada as recently as 2005.

"These results are not unexpected in a given surveillance activity," DeHaven said at the media briefing.

Sue Hazeltine, associate director of biology for the US Geological Survey at the Department of the Interior (DOI), said the agency has taken 8,000 wild bird samples since early June. About 4,000 were from dead birds taken by subsistence hunters in Alaska, and the rest were from live birds. "Less than 2% have shown avian influenza of any type, which is standard and what we would expect to find across the country at any point," she said. None have tested positive for low-pathogenic H5N1.

DeHaven said there is no reason to believe the swans had any connections to any commercial poultry operations, and the findings do not provide a basis for any country to impose any trade restrictions on the United States.

On Aug 9 the USDA and the DOI announced they are expanding wild bird monitoring for H5N1 avian influenza beyond Alaska in partnerships with the lower 48 states, Hawaii, and other Pacific islands. Surveillance in Western states in the Pacific flyway during late summer and fall will coincide with the southward migration of birds that have been exposed to Asian species this summer in the Arctic. Surveillance in Alaska has been under way since summer 2005.

See also:

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2006/08/0297.xml - Transcript of Aug 14 USDA/DOI briefing on Michigan swans

Aug 14 USDA http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2006/08/0296.xml - fact sheet on low pathogenic vs high pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza

Dec 20, 2005, CIDRAP News article: " http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/dec3005halvorson.html - H5N1 avian flu viruses: What's in a name? "

Aug 10 CIDRAP News article: " http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/aug1006migratory.html - US's wild bird H5N1 monitoring expands beyond Alaska "

 

Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy
http://www.ahc.umn.edu/ - Academic Health Center -- http://www1.umn.edu/twincities/index.php - University of Minnesota
Copyright © 2006 Regents of the University of Minnesota



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 5:04pm
Originally posted by argyll argyll wrote:

What low strain are they talking about? I saw a few article on news now bird flu, but no mention of the low path strain. This is coming from the White House, so it seems important.  There are at 6 or more stories floating on the wires.
 
MedClinician -- can you get confirmation on the strain?
 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208262,00.html - http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208262,00.html
 
http://www.wchstv.com/newsroom/nnews/news1.shtml - http://www.wchstv.com/newsroom/nnews/news1.shtml


I noticed this just a few minutes ago and you know how carefully all of this must be worded.

I will do some crawling to see if I can get to some further out there links but just a few comments after all this research and work.

1) The release of the info is being done by the book as far as who and how, so it would be highly unlikely if premliminary tests weren't pretty solid, we would not be hearing anything.
2) With a thousand people and now more on this thread is unlikely I can research this quicker than people like Jhetta and Sand.
3) This is probably not new information.

Reading over Sands post - this is looking pretty solid considering who is saying what. As well as someone, somewhere wants it to be said.




Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 6:00pm
Much is the same info, but read through it.  Interesting nuggets in here.
 

Scientists Studying Possible Case of Bird Flu in U.S.

Lauran Neergaard
AP Medical Writer

August 14, 2006, 5:32 PM PDT

Scientists have discovered possible bird flu in two wild swans on the shore of Lake Erie - but it does not appear to be the much-feared Asian strain that has ravaged poultry and killed at least 138 people elsewhere in the world.

It will take up to two weeks to confirm whether the seemingly healthy wild mute swans in Michigan really harbored the H5N1 virus or not.

On Monday, the Agriculture Department declared that initial testing had ruled out the so-called highly pathogenic version of H5N1 - but that they could have a relatively harmless, low-grade H5N1 strain instead.

That's the suspicion, making Monday's announcement almost a practice run for the day the more worrisome Asian strain actually arrives.

"This is not the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that has spread through much of other parts of the world," said Ron DeHaven, administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, adding, "We do not believe this virus represents a risk to human health."

Monday's announcement was the first reported hit from a massive new program to test up to 100,000 wild birds in an effort to catch the deadly Asian H5N1 virus if it does wing its way to North America, something the government thinks could happen this year.

Were the highly pathogenic H5N1 to be found in any wild birds here, that could trigger additional security steps to prevent infection of commercial poultry flocks, and even more intensive monitoring.

Wild birds, especially waterfowl, are flu's natural reservoir - they carry a multitude of influenza viruses. Sometimes, those strains jump species, and if it's a flu virus very different from one people have experienced before, a worldwide epidemic could result.

That's why scientists have closely tracked the virulent H5N1 strain since it began its global march in late 2003. It is blamed for the death or destruction of millions of birds overseas. Virtually all the people who have caught it did so from close contact with infected birds or their droppings. But scientists worry that the virus eventually could mutate to become easily spread from person to person.

Last week, the government expanded the bird-testing program to encompass the entire nation, after initial sampling mostly in Alaska. Twenty mute swans from a Monroe County, Mich., game area were among the first new batches of tests - because, coincidentally, they were part of a state program to lower overcrowding of the nonnative species. That testing found the possibility of H5N1 in two of the swans.

Initial genetic testing ruled out the deadly Asian strain. In fact, USDA said the virus' genes suggest that it is similar to a low-grade North American version of H5N1, a virus found here in wild ducks in 1975 and 1986 and on a Michigan turkey farm in 2003. Another similar version was detected last year in Canada, and scientists have thought it probably common in wild birds - but didn't have the testing to prove it.

"This is no surprise," DeHaven stressed.

Plus, all the swans appeared healthy, a good signal, he added. The virulent form of H5N1 usually rapidly sickens birds.

So why Monday's announcement? To be open about all this testing, DeHaven said. And even low-pathogenic H5N1 requires monitoring, because it has the potential to mutate into the more virulent form, he added.

More important, "It was a real good test run of the system," Dr. Willie Reed, director of the Michigan State University laboratory where the initial testing was done, told The Associated Press.

Flu strains are named for two proteins that stud the virus' surface. There are 16 known hemagglutinin versions, the "H," and nine neuramindases, the "N."

Michigan State's initial screening tests searched for the presence of H5 or H7, two variants that can signal signs of concern in birds. On Friday, Reed's lab alerted USDA's confirmatory laboratory in Ames, Iowa, that it had found H5 in the two swans.

Over the weekend, more testing at Ames found the N1 protein. That doesn't necessarily mean the swans harbored the H5N1 strain; they could have carried two different flu strains at once, say an H5N2 and an H6N1.

That's a lot of science-speak to say stay tuned: It will take up to two weeks to sort out exactly what the swans had, and to make sure it was a low-pathogen version - by injecting baby chicks with the swans' virus to see if they die.

---

On the Web:

Copyright © 2006, KTLA

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Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:36pm
It depends on how you define the word "it".      
 
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 7:54pm
First the terroist in Columbus.....now the BF in Lake Erie...which is only 45 minutes from ME!
 
Ok.....deep breath and turn up the praise and worship music I am listening too...............


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 14 2006 at 8:02pm
OK now that our cherry has been popped I see it as just another slow news day - Peace between Isreal and Hezbulah, oil prices have leveled out so news starved media will have a hey day with a couple of low path swans in Michigan.  This is going to turn into a complete circus and some innocent uniformed people will needlessly be misguided by the  sugar-coated propaganda overhyped by the media as breaking news.  Bird flu is already a huge money maker for the sharks and they are only getting warmed up - just wait.  We already have BF video games, I can't wait to see the BF greeting cards next.


Posted By: pheasant
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 2:41am
interesting how they can say "low path " beacouse the swans dont have h5n1 but they did find h5 and n1....by definition h5n1 is high path right.im flabbergasted that spin can be used here....

-------------
The only thing we have to fear, is fear itself......FDR


Posted By: flowerchild
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 2:53am
 our local Michigan news  did a 2 sentence piece on it, and said even if it is the "bad" virus it isn't a risk to public health safety.  Uggg.  we are in so much trouble , when it actually does come here.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 3:33am
Bird Flu Found in U.S. Isn't Lethal, Early Tests Show (Update3)

Aug. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Two Michigan birds found to be infected with bird flu don't have the lethal form spreading elsewhere in the world, U.S. officials said today.

Initial genetic tests show the two wild mute swans, found in a southeastern Michigan nature preserve, have a mild form of avian flu, or H5N1, that has been detected in North America several times earlier, said Ron DeHaven, the administrator of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, in a news briefing today.

``This is not the highly pathogenic avian influenza that has spread in other parts of the world,'' DeHaven said in the briefing. ``We do not believe that this represents a threat to human health.''

Health officials worldwide are concerned that the lethal type of H5N1 bird flu might take on a form that can spread easily in humans, possibly setting off a worldwide health catastrophe. That stain of the virus has spread to people in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, mostly through direct contact with poultry, killing at least 139, the World Health Organization said today.

Further testing to ensure that the virus found in Michigan can't kill young chickens will take seven to 10 days, the USDA's DeHaven said. The discovery of the mild strain shouldn't be viewed as a reason for any country to impose trade restrictions on U.S. commercial poultry, he said.

Poultry Shares Rise

Shares of Springdale Arkansas-based Tyson Foods Inc., the world's biggest poultry producer, rose 20 cents, or 1.5 percent, to $13.65 at 1:28 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. The stock had dropped 24 percent in the past year before trading began today, partly as concerns about avian influenza eroded exports of chicken meat.

Pittsburg, Texas-based Pilgrim's Pride, the No. 2 U.S. poultry company, rose 21 cents, or 1 percent, to $23.37 in New York. The shares had fallen 31 percent over the past year before today.

China confirmed a human death from the deadly form of the H5N1 virus today, and Indonesia reported a case, bringing worldwide infections to 238 people in 10 countries, according to the United Nations' WHO.

The lethal form of H5N1 has never been found in North America. A non-lethal type was found in U.S. birds in 1975 and 1986 and in two ducks in Manitoba in August 2005, according to the USDA Web site. Genetic tests suggest the Michigan swans might have a similar strain, DeHaven said.

`Not a Surprising Event'

Finding the virus was ``not a surprising event to us,'' said Sue Haseltine, associate director for biology at the Interior Department's U.S. Geological Survey, in today's briefing. ``We have been increasing our surveillance for all influenza subtypes through all wildlife species across the country.''

Wild birds commonly carry flu viruses and are considered the reservoir of the disease from which most human influenzas emerge. The birds, two of 20 swans that were tested, probably caught the virus as animals normally do, through contact with infected blood or feces, Haseltine said.

Avian influenzas are known to change quickly, and some strains can mutate from a mild form into a more deadly one. The mild H5N1 virus in North America might mutate into a form more dangerous to birds but presents no danger in its current form, DeHaven said. The tested birds appeared to be healthy, and no other birds in the preserve appeared ill, he said.

The Departments of Agriculture and Interior said Aug. 9 that they would expand testing of wild birds to the lower 48 states. Intensive testing began last year in Alaska and Hawaii, where scientists said migratory birds harboring the virus might return from Asia.

About 8,000 birds have been tested since early June, about half from the catches of native Alaskan subsistence hunters, Haseltine said. Intensive testing in the lower 48 states will begin in August, she said.


To contact the reporters on this story:
Daniel Goldstein in Washington at 
dgoldstein@bloomberg.net;
John Lauerman in Boston at   mailto:jlauerman@bloomberg.net - jlauerman@bloomberg.net .
 
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=acjp4vG.R5ZQ&refer=us - http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=acjp4vG.R5ZQ&refer=us 


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 6:29am
I think it is important to note that the H5 strains of avian influenza have been around for some time.  It is only recently in our timeline that the virus made changes in that caused it to become more virolent and lethal in birds and then mamals and humans.  The H5N1 virus made these changes in Asia not in North America.
 
Virologist can track these changes by the looking at the genes that have changed.  So when they look at the recent H5 virus found in Michigan... they can see if it has the changes found in Indonesia, China, etc that make it more deadly... like the PB 627 change.
 
Because H5 and H7 virus... can change from Low Path to High Path... the US and many other countries have procedures in place to test all H5 and H7 virus and ALL H5 virus found in the US are sent to Ames for the following:
 
"Samples will be shipped to a network of laboratories across the country for screening. If a sample contains evidence of the H5 virus, it then gets shipped to Ames, where tests are run over several days to determine if the infected bird carried the H5N1 strain.
 
First, virus from the sample is injected in bird eggs, which are tested five days later to determine whether it is one of 144 strains of bird flu or whether it is another disease such as Exotic Newcastle, which is harmless to humans but deadly to poultry.

If it contains bird flu, the sample is tested to determine whether it is H5N1 or another of the avian influenzas. Only those testing positive for H5N1 go to the lab with the caged chickens.

Eight of these birds, specially bred and disease-free, are injected with virus from the suspect sample. Perhaps within hours, certainly in two days, the birds will begin moving more slowly, perhaps hunching in the corner of the cage and no longer eating and drinking. Their wattles might turn from bright orange to blue.

"If you lose 75 percent of the chickens, or more, then it's high-path," said Brundaben Panigrahy, head of the lab's avian section, using scientists' shorthand for the lethal strain of Asian bird flu.

Although the test results will be announced publicly, likely by officials in Washington, Granger said this will not be a signal of a threat to humans."

 


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 6:59am

Lab Prepares for Bird Flu Testing

Agriculture Department's lab in Ames, Iowa, prepares for bird flu testing
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/23/ap/health/mainD8HPPLFG1.shtml - http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/23/ap/health/mainD8HPPLFG1.shtml


AMES, Iowa, May. 23, 2006
By LIBBY QUAID AP Food and Farm Writer
(AP) Inside an Agriculture Department building known as C-3, four young chickens strut nervously in their cage. They are part of the government's network of defense against deadly bird flu.

"These are nice, bright, healthy birds," says veterinarian Michelle Crocheck, who is decked out in protective clothing that is part "ER" and part lobster fisherman.

If suspected cases of bird flu are found at other screening labs across the country, the future for Crocheck's charges is grim.

The four fowl _ and hundreds like them _ are key players in a complex testing process at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories that will determine whether the highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu virus has arrived in the United States.

"Lab diagnosis is definitely the centerpiece of the whole avian influenza response," said Larry Granger, who oversees emergency management for the Agriculture Department.

The labs _ normally off-limits to anyone but the scientists who work there _ were opened Tuesday to journalists for a walkthrough of the nation's only internationally recognized bird flu testing program.

Researchers test for bird flu, mad cow disease and many other animal diseases on the 640-acre campus near Iowa State University. The sprawling green lawns and low buildings are under tight security.

Known as the H5N1 strain of bird influenza, the virus spread from Asia, where it's blamed for the slaughter of 200 million birds, to Africa and Europe. The virus has killed at least 124 people.

No one knows whether the virus will reach the U.S. or develop into a strain of deadly flu that can be transmitted easily by humans.

To help determine when and where it arrives, the government has begun a massive testing program. The first phase started in Alaska, where thousands of migratory birds will be captured and swabbed. The birds are considered natural reservoirs for bird flu and can harbor hundred of different flu viruses.

Samples will be shipped to a network of laboratories across the country for screening. If a sample contains evidence of the H5 virus, it then gets shipped to Ames, where tests are run over several days to determine if the infected bird carried the H5N1 strain.

First, virus from the sample is injected in bird eggs, which are tested five days later to determine whether it is one of 144 strains of bird flu or whether it is another disease such as Exotic Newcastle, which is harmless to humans but deadly to poultry.

If it contains bird flu, the sample is tested to determine whether it is H5N1 or another of the avian influenzas. Only those testing positive for H5N1 go to the lab with the caged chickens.

Eight of these birds, specially bred and disease-free, are injected with virus from the suspect sample. Perhaps within hours, certainly in two days, the birds will begin moving more slowly, perhaps hunching in the corner of the cage and no longer eating and drinking. Their wattles might turn from bright orange to blue.

"If you lose 75 percent of the chickens, or more, then it's high-path," said Brundaben Panigrahy, head of the lab's avian section, using scientists' shorthand for the lethal strain of Asian bird flu.

Although the test results will be announced publicly, likely by officials in Washington, Granger said this will not be a signal of a threat to humans.

"If we find this virus in the wild bird population, it doesn't necessarily mean there's a human health risk," Granger said. "Likewise, it doesn't mean there is a risk to commercial poultry."

So far, the virus has mostly affected birds. Those who have died from the virus _ mostly in Asia _ had close contact with infected birds. However, scientists cautioned that the virus could mutate into a form that spreads easily among people and could spark an epidemic.

"Finding it in a migratory bird is an early warning system," Ron DeHaven, head of the Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, said in a recent interview.

"So it would be cause for us to put out an alert, do some additional surveillance testing and do some education and outreach, in terms of practicing good biosecurity," DeHaven said.

___

On the Net:

Agriculture Department: http://www.usda.gov - http://www.usda.gov
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 7:02am

Awesome post. Jhetta.



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 9:20am
"If a sample contains evidence of the H5 virus, it then gets shipped to Ames."

Does anyone know if it would be clear whether or not there is H5 in a sample?




Posted By: Mahshadin
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 12:48pm
Sounds to me like our testing system in the USA is quite Bad.
 
Do one test for part of the virus (H5) in one location then if posative send it off to another location for another test (N1). And in the end if both are posative they can still say it might just be 2 viruses like H5N2 and H7N1.
 
Something just is not passing the smell test here  (Any Opinions)


-------------
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act."   G Orwell


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 1:27pm
Originally posted by Mahshadin Mahshadin wrote:

Sounds to me like our testing system in the USA is quite Bad.
 
Do one test for part of the virus (H5) in one location then if posative send it off to another location for another test (N1). And in the end if both are posative they can still say it might just be 2 viruses like H5N2 and H7N1.
 
Something just is not passing the smell test here  (Any Opinions)
 
Well, if the CIA and the FBI could not communicate properly before 911 t makes it hard to blame someone later.  Maybe it is the same here.


Posted By: Mahshadin
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 1:35pm
And exactly how long does it take to go through two tests at two different locations without conclusive results?
 
And why would anyone ever consider this to be acceptable at any level?
 
This sounds like a testing system set up for delay and denial!!!
 
Who in the #### is in charge in this country


-------------
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act."   G Orwell


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 2:36pm
What did everyone think of the briefing? I am still surprised to hear this so soon . I thought the White House did a great job of informing us. I keep thinking about Ames and the next level of testing. Ames, Iowa testing -- I still can't believe it is here.


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 15 2006 at 9:36pm
Suggested reading
 
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Posted By: Fiddlerdave3
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 2:15am
"And exactly how long does it take to go through two tests at two different locations without conclusive results?
 
And why would anyone ever consider this to be acceptable at any level?
 
This sounds like a testing system set up for delay and denial!!!"
 
BINGO!!!!!!!!!!!!  As the weeks go by,  I see more conflicting stories, policies that make no sense, I see a parody worthy of the Marx Brothers, or probably more like the 3 Stooges, a mixture of obfuscation, partial truths, fantasies, denial, denial, denial.  Basically, the collective human consciousness is not able to handle the horror of The Coming Plague (tip of the hat to Laurie Garrett!). 
 
With all this time to prepare, with all the policies, meetings, handouts, billions spent, we can't even effectively test a couple birds.  There is nobody at the wheel and we are driving straight to hell.  The only efficient action was to issue the reasurrance that there is no problem, no issues, its low path, its a gummy bear, go to sleep children there's nothing in the closet, go to the mall and buy a new big screen TV and watch the Super Bowl (that very well may not occur).  Now THERE'S a disaster that might motivate the public and politicians!
 
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 4:37am

Michigan bird flu cases cited in Korea poultry ban

Associated Press

SEOUL, South Korea - South Korea said Wednesday it was halting inspections of U.S. poultry imports as a precaution - effectively banning such products - after authorities discovered possible bird flu in two wild swans in the state of Michigan.

The South Korean Agriculture Ministry will lift the suspension if the virus is confirmed as a low-pathogenic form, said Oh Soon-min, an official of the ministry's animal health division.

However, he said Seoul would formally ban imports of U.S. poultry if the virus turns out to be the highly pathogenic version of the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu.

On Monday, the U.S. Agriculture Department said that initial tests showed that two wild swans in Monroe County, Mich., did not have the so-called highly pathogenic version of H5N1 - but that they could have a relatively harmless, low-grade H5N1 strain instead.

South Korea imported 26,214 tons of poultry, including chicken, from the United States in the first six months of 2006.

The U.S. Agriculture Department said Monday that initial testing on the swans ruled out the most worrisome version of H5N1 - but that they could have a relatively harmless, low-grade strain instead. Complete tests will take about two weeks.

The H5N1 virus began ravaging Asian poultry stocks in late 2003 and has killed dozens of people worldwide.

http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/journalgazette/business/15286168.htm - http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/journalgazette/business/15286168.htm


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 5:18am
 
Overview From All Above Articles
 
1. Initial Rapid Tests detected H5N1
2. Second Tests at the very high tech Ames Facility confirmed H5N1
3. Genetic investigation shows that the new H5N1 detected in Michigan is not related to the strain in Asia
4. Protocol requires all H5 virus to be tested in live animals to determine if it is High Path... And testing is currently being carried out on the new H5N1 strain in live chickens at the Ames facility.
5. Disclosure of the above info puts the US at risk of trade bans on our Poulty Products and yet the goverment release the info to the public fully understanding the implications!
6. Low Path H5N1 was detected in Canada August 2005 as well as the US in the past!
 
I don't know what more they can do and I am personally pleased at the transparency so far.
 
Really check.... we know about it and Washington released the information!
 
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 5:27am
Me too, Jhetta.  So far, so good.


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 7:40am

"If you lose 75 percent of the chickens, or more, then it's high-path," said Brundaben Panigrahy, head of the lab's avian section, using scientists' shorthand for the lethal strain of Asian bird flu.

If you say so, but just as long as we don't see 60% die and then we come up with MPAI for "medium" path.  
 
 
 
 
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 8:59am
Albert,
 
Can't help wonder if you are right -- medium path next time. This kind of reminds me of the rewriting/changing levels with WHO. What I find particulary interesting -- was the fact that LPAI H5NI has not been mentioned or shown up recently anywhere ( please correct me if I am wrong). That is what threw me off from the beginning. It reminds me of the statement MedClinician made -- if they had come and made a statement that was worded different, the response would have been completely different across the board. Two weeks? That's a long time ...


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 9:55am
More Bans...as expected.
 
 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060816/hl_nm/mexico_poultry_ban_dc - Back to Story - http://help.yahoo.com/ - Help
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Mexico bans poultry from bird flu-hit Michigan

45 minutes ago

Mexico has halted all poultry and bird imports from Michigan, the government said on Wednesday, after U.S. tests revealed two swans in the state were likely infected with a low-pathogen strain of bird flu.

A spokesman for the agriculture ministry said Mexico had stopped all imports of birds from Michigan until further notice.

The Mexican import ban covers imports of poultry, eggs and pet birds, as well as poultry products used for breeding.

U.S. Department of Agriculture officials said on Monday that tests conducted in the state found two swans likely have a low-pathogenic strain of the H5N1 bird flu virus, but had not contracted the deadly strain of H5N1.

Pathogenicity refers to the ability of the virus to produce a disease. A low-pathogenic strain produces less disease and mortality in birds than does a high-pathogenic version.

Further tests on the Michigan swans were underway and would be available in about two weeks, according to the USDA.

The Western Hemisphere so far has had no confirmed cases of the deadly version, which has killed more than 130 people worldwide since late 2003 and led to the deaths of hundreds of millions of poultry.

The low-pathogenic strain of H5N1 has been found six times in the United States since 1975, most recently in 2002. A similar low-pathogenic strain was found in Canada last year.

Mexican authorities killed some 300 birds after detecting low-pathogenic bird flu on homesteads in the southern state of Chiapas in December.

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Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 10:05am

I don't know if this has been mentioned yet, but could this have anything to do with the tainted meat they were looking for a couple of months ago after smuggled duck meat was found in Detroit??

They had recovered a wharehouse full of it, but there was still much of it unaccounted for....



Posted By: Left Field
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 10:37am
two weeks, we'll get plenty of BS hitting the fan during that period.


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 10:57am
That's two countries that have banned imports from MI.  Didn't anyone tell them about LPAI yet?  
 
 
 
 
 


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:00am
Originally posted by argyll argyll wrote:

Albert,
 
Can't help wonder if you are right -- medium path next time. This kind of reminds me of the rewriting/changing levels with WHO. What I find particulary interesting -- was the fact that LPAI H5NI has not been mentioned or shown up recently anywhere ( please correct me if I am wrong). That is what threw me off from the beginning. It reminds me of the statement MedClinician made -- if they had come and made a statement that was worded different, the response would have been completely different across the board. Two weeks? That's a long time ...
 
Argly,
 
I have mentioned Low Path H5N1 many times on these boards and several times in this post.  Two weeks to complete the tests on live chickens is resonable.  The incubation periods have been cited as long as 21 days... however it is most likely 4 to 7 days.  They inject live virus into live birds and watch for disease.
 
http://www.avianflutalk.com/forum_posts.asp?TID=10628&KW=A%2FMallard%2FWisconsin%2F428%2F75&PID=92800#92800 - http://www.avianflutalk.com/forum_posts.asp?TID=10628&KW=A%2FMallard%2FWisconsin%2F428%2F75&PID=92800#92800  

Here are a few that have been sequenced... in the US, Mexico and I included just a few for Canada...Note only those that have been sequenced are included.

Note they are culling for H5 and H7 even if they are low path because they can become high path!

Strain Year Serotype
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/169/75 1975 H5 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/944/82 1982 H5 
A/Mallard/Ohio/86 1986 H5 
A/Mallard/Ohio/556/87 1987 H5 
A/Emu/Texas/39924/93 1993 H5 
A/Chicken/Hidalgo/26654-1368/94 1994 H5 
A/Chicken/Mexico/31381-1/94 1994 H5 
A/Chicken/Mexico/31381-7/94 1994 H5 
A/Chicken/Queretaro/14588-19/95 1995 H5 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/428/75   1975 H5N1 
A/Gull/Pennsylvania/4175/83 1983 H5N1 
A/turkey/Colorado/72 1972 H5N2 
A/mallard duck/Alberta/57/1976 1976 H5N2 
A/duck/Hong Kong/342/78 1978 H5N2 
A/duck/Michigan/80 1980 H5N2 
A/mallard duck/Alberta/645/1980 1980 H5N2 
A/mallard duck/Alberta/645/1980 1980 H5N2 
A/mallard/Alberta/645/80 1980 H5N2 
A/mallard/MI/18/80 1980 H5N2 
A/mallard/MN/25/80 1980 H5N2 
A/duck/MN/1516/1981 1981 H5N2 
A/duck/MN/1564/81 1981 H5N2 
A/Turkey/Minnesota/3689-1551/81 1981 H5N2 
A/turkey/TX/14082/81 1981 H5N2 
A/mallard/NY/189/82 1982 H5N2 
A/turkey/MN/1704/82 1982 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/1/83 1983 H5N2 
A/chicken/Pennsylvania/8125/83 1983 H5N2 
A/Turkey/Virginia/6962/83 1983 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Virginia/40018/84 1984 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Washington/13413/84 1984 H5N2 
A/duck/Pennsylvania/84 1984 H5N2 
A/Mallard Duck/Pensylvania/10218/84 1984 H5N2 
A/Turkey/Virginia/40018/84 1984 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Florida/27716-2/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Massachusetts/11801/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Chicken/New Jersey/12508/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Ohio/22911-10/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/10210/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Quail/Oregon/20719/86 1986 H5N2 
A/Chicken/New York/12004-3/87 1987 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Florida/22780-2/88 1988 H5N2 
A/Mallard/Ohio/345/88 1988 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Florida/2507/89 1989 H5N2 
A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware/244/91 1991 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/13609/93 1993 H5N2 
A/Emu/Texas/39442/93 (HP progeny) 1993 H5N2 
A/Emu/Texas/39442/93 (non-HP parent) 1993 H5N2 
A/Emu/Texas/39924/93 1993 H5N2 
A/chicken/Hidalgo/232/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Hidalgo/26654-1368/94 1994 H5N2 
A/chicken/Hidalgo/28159-232/1994 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Jalisco/14585-660/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Mexico/26654-1374/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Mexico/31381-2/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Mexico/31382-1/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Puebla/14585-622/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Puebla/14586-654/94 1994 H5N2 
A/chicken/Puebla/8623-607/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Puebla/8623-607/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Puebla/8624-604/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Queretaro/14588-19/94 1994 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Queretaro/26654-1373/94 1994 H5N2 
A/chicken/Guanajuato/28159-331/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Hidalgo/28159-460/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Jalisco/28159-600/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Mexico/28159-541/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Morelos/28159-538/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Puebla/28159-474/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Queretaro/14588-19/95 1995 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Queretaro/7653-20/95 1995 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Queretaro/7653-20/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/VeraCruz/28159-398/95 1995 H5N2 
A/Turkey/Minnesota/10734/95 1995 H5N2 
A/chicken/Mexico/37821-771/96 1996 H5N2 
A/chicken/Chiapas/15224/97 1997 H5N2 
A/chicken/Chiapas/15405/97 1997 H5N2 
A/chicken/Chiapas/15406/97 1997 H5N2 
A/chicken/Chis/15224/1997 1997 H5N2 
A/chicken/Mexico/15407/97 1997 H5N2 
A/Chicken/Mexico/26654-1374/97 1997 H5N2 
A/chukkar/MN/14591-7/98 1998 H5N2 
A/chukkar/MN/14951-7/98 1998 H5N2 
A/mallard/MN/133/98 1998 H5N2 
A/pheasant/NJ/1355/98 1998 H5N2 
A/avian/NY/31588-3/00 2000 H5N2 
A/avian/NY/53726/00 2000 H5N2 
A/chukkar/NY/51375/00 2000 H5N2 
A/duck/NY/44018-2/00 2000 H5N2 
A/duck/NJ/117228-7/01 2001 H5N2 
A/mallard/AR/1C/2001 2001 H5N2 
A/duck/ME/151895-7A/02 2002 H5N2 
A/duck/NY/185502/02 2002 H5N2 
A/duck/NY/186875/02 2002 H5N2 
A/duck/NY/191255-79/02 2002 H5N2 
A/turkey/CA/D0208651-C/02 2002 H5N2 
A/turkey/CA/D0208652-C/02 2002 H5N2 
A/chicken/TX/298313/04 2004 H5N2 
A/parrot/CA/6032/04 2004 H5N2 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/169/75 1975 H5N3 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/169/75 1975 H5N3 
A/goose/Hong Kong/23/1978 1978 H5N3 
A/turkey/CA/6878/79 1979 H5N3 
A/herring gull/New Jersey/402/1989 1989 H5N3 
A/herring gull/New Jersey/406/1989 1989 H5N3 
A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/2242/00 2000 H5N3 
A/chicken/TX/167280-4/02 2002 H5N3 
A/gull/Delaware/4/2000 2000 H5N4 
A/gull/Delaware/5/2000 2000 H5N4 
A/shorebird/Delaware/109/2000 2000 H5N4 
A/shorebird/Delaware/230/2000 2000 H5N4 
A/shorebird/Delaware/243/2000 2000 H5N4 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/34/75 1975 H5N6 
A/Mallard/Wisconsin/34/75 1975 H5N6 
A/duck/Potsdam/2216-4/1984 1984 H5N6 
A/shorebird/Delaware/101/2004 2004 H5N7 
A/shorebird/Delaware/75/2004 2004 H5N7 
A/herring gull/Delaware/281/98 1998 H5N8 
A/shorebird/Delaware/207/98 1998 H5N8 
A/shorebird/Delaware/27/98 1998 H5N8 
A/duck/NY/191255-59/02 2002 H5N8 
A/Turkey/Ontario/7732/66 1966 H5N9 
A/Turkey/Ontario/7732/66 1966 H5N9 
A/turkey/Wisconsin/68 1968 H5N9 
A/Mallard/Ohio/556/1987 1987 H5N9 
A/Turkey/Oregon/71 1971 H7 
A/magpie-robin/China/28710/93 1993 H7 
A/chicken/Jalisco/1994 1994 H7 
A/chicken/New York/1995 1995 H7 
A/duck/Mongolia/736/02-duck/Hokkaido/49/98 1998 H7 
A/rhea/North Carolina/39482/93 1993 H7N1 
A/Shorebird/Delaware/39/95 1995 H7N1 
A/gull/Delaware/2838/87 1987 H7N2 
A/laughing gull/Delaware/2838/87 1987 H7N2 
A/gull/Italy/692-2/93 1993 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/13142-5/94 1994 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/4447-7/94 1994 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/13142-5/94 1994 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/4447-7/94 1994 H7N2 
A/Turkey/New York/4450-5/94 1994 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/13833-7/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/13833-7/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/13833-7/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/19542-5/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/3112-1/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/19542/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/3112-1/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/Rhode Island/4328/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Guinea Fowl/New York/13820-3/95 1995 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/3202-7/96 1996 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/8030-2/96 1996 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/13202-7/96 1996 H7N2 
A/Guinea Fowl/Pennsylvania/7777-1/96 1996 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/6777-3/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/6777-3/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/9701027/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/9701027B/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/9701524/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/9701530/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/11767-1/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/11767-1/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/11767-1/97 1997 H7N2 
A/GuineaFowl/NY/13820-3/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Quail/PA/20304/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Turkey/PA/7975/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Turkey/Pennsylvania/7975/97 1997 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/9777-7/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/1387-8/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/21665-73/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/3572/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/6013-19/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/6031-19/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/13552-1/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/9801289/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/13552-1/98 1998 H7N2 
A/GiuineaFowl/NJ/13246-9/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Goose/New Jersey/8600-3/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Goose/NJ/8600-3/98 1998 H7N2 
A/GuineaFowl/NJ/13246-9/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Quail/New York/13989-51/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Quail/NY/13989/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Quail/PA/20304/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Turkey/NJ/9778-8/98 1998 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New Jersey/20621/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New York/34173-3/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/15814-9/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/15827/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/16224-6/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/17206/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/20621/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/1398-6/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/14714-2/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/14858-12/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/21586-8/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/22409-4/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/34173-3/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Quail/NY/11430/99 1999 H7N2 
A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware/130/99 1999 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/70411-12/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/73063-6/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/74211-2/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/76247-3/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/7729-6/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/81746-5/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Chicken/New Jersey/30739-6/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/30739-6/00 2000 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/30749-3/00 2000 H7N2 
A/pheasant/NJ/30739-9/2000 2000 H7N2 
A/Avian/NY/118353-1/01 2001 H7N2 
A/Chicken/FL/90348-4/01 2001 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/118555-2/01 2001 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NY/119055-7/01 2001 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/143586/01 2001 H7N2 
A/unknown/NY/74211-5/2001 2001 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/150383-7/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/151244-18/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Chicken/NJ/608/02 2002 H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/143586/2002 2002 H7N2 
A/Chicken/PA/149092-1/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Chicken/VA/32/02 2002 H7N2 
A/GuineaFowl/MA/148081/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Turkey/NC/11165/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Turkey/VA/158512/02 2002 H7N2 
A/Turkey/VA/67/02 2002 H7N2 
A/chicken/MD/MINH MA/03 2003 H7N2 
A/Turkey/Oregon/71 1971 H7N3
A/pheasant/MN/917/1980 1980 H7N3
A/Turkey/Oregon/71 1971 H7N3 
A/turkey/TX/1/79 1979 H7N3 
A/pheasant/MN/917/1980 1980 H7N3 
A/turkey/Minnesota/1237/80 1980 H7N3 
A/turkey/Minnesota/916/80 1980 H7N3 
A/turkey/MN/1200/80 1980 H7N3 
A/mallard/Alberta/699/81 1981 H7N3 
A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/21525/83 1983 H7N3 
A/gadwall/MD/3495/83 1983 H7N3 
A/ruddy turnstone/New Jersey/65/1985 1985 H7N3 
A/turkey/CO/13356/91 1991 H7N3 
A/Turkey/Colorado/13356/91 1991 H7N3 
A/Chicken/New Jersey/15086-3/94 1994 H7N3 
A/chicken/NJ/15086-3/94 1994 H7N3 
A/Quail/Arkansas/16309-7/94 1994 H7N3 
A/chicken/Pakistan/16/99/95 1995 H7N3 
A/chicken/Pakistan/447/95 1995 H7N3 
A/chicken/Pakistan/CR2/95 1995 H7N3 
A/chicken/Queensland/667/95 1995 H7N3 
A/Turkey/Utah/24721-10/95 1995 H7N3 
A/mallard/MN/187/98 1998 H7N3 
A/mallard/MN/190/98 1998 H7N3 
A/mallard/MN/284/98 1998 H7N3 
A/mallard/MN/88/98 1998 H7N3 
A/Chicken/New York/12273-11/99 1999 H7N3 
A/Chicken/NY/12273-11/99 1999 H7N3 
A/Chicken/NY/14714-9/99 1999 H7N3 
A/pintail/MN/423/99 1999 H7N3 
A/laughing gull/NY/2455/00 2000 H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/TX/2/01 2001 H7N3 
A/Duck/NJ/117228-7/01 2001 H7N3 
A/Duck/PA/143585/01 2001 H7N3 
A/Duck/Nanchang/1944/93 1993 H7N4 
A/chicken/NSW/1/97 1997 H7N4 
A/blue-winged teal/TX/11/01 2001 H7N4 
A/blue-winged teal/TX/11/01 2001 H7N4 
A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware/2770/87 1987 H7N5 
A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware/2378/1988 1988 H7N7 
A/chicken/Ireland/1733/89 1989 H7N7 
A/non-psittacine/England-Q/1985/89 1989 H7N7 
A/red knot/New Jersey/325/1989 1989 H7N7 
A/RedKnot/Delaware/259/94 1994 H7N7 
A/mallard/MN/17/99 1999 H7N7 
A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware/134/99 1999 H7N7 
A/Duck/Ohio/421/87 1987 H7N8 
A/mallard/Alberta/114/1999 1999 H7N9 
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/1538/00 2000 H7N9 
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/629/00 2000 H7N9 
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/629/00 2000 H7N9 


Posted By: candice
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:18am
JHetta you have the most amazing posts ,  always current to the moment .
 
Sorry there are alot of you who really make this forum current and intelligent 
 
Well DOne


-------------
If you cant get in the front door try the side door then the back door.


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:24am
Our Chicken has been banned in other countries for H5 and H7 in the past.
 
U.S. Faces Trade Bans Over H7 Bird Flu

WASHINGTON - Feb 11/04 - SNS -- The avian flu situation in the United States took a turn for the worse with the discovery of a second flock of chickens infected with the milder H7 strain of avian influenza -- one which is not capable of being transferred to humans. This is completely different from the dangerous, H5N1 strain sweeping through Asia. http://www.statpub.com/news/79465.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/79465.html - click here

 
Ukraine Will Not Ban All U.S. Chicken

KIEV - Feb 17/04 - APK -- According to the State Department of Veterinary Medicine, Ukraine at the moment is not going to ban imports of chicken meat, products and raw materials, because of the "bird flu" cases, detected in some states. http://www.statpub.com/news/80156.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/80156.html - click here

 
Bans on Canadian Poultry Mount

OTTAWA - Feb 20/04 - SNS -- Temporary bans on imports of Canadian poultry started to mount within the first 24 hours after the announcement the H7 strain of avian influenza was found on a poultry farm in the province of British Columbia. http://www.statpub.com/news/80678.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/80678.html - click here

Bird Flu Found in Texas

AUSTIN - Feb 20/04 - SNS -- A flock of chickens in Gonzales County in Texas has tested positive for the H7 strain of avian influenza (AI), a contagious viral respiratory infection of poultry and birds, according to officials with the state veterinary service. http://www.statpub.com/news/80751.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/80751.html - click here

Canada Confirms Low Pathogenic Bird Flu

OTTAWA - Feb 20/04 - SNS -- Laboratory tests confirm the strain of avian influenza found on a British Columbia farm is the low pathogenic H7 strain, reports the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). http://www.statpub.com/news/80854.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/80854.html - click here


Slight Dip In January Egg Output

WASHINGTON - Feb 23/04 - SNS -- Egg production in the United States slipped below year earlier levels during January, totalling 7.38 billion, according to the USDA. http://www.statpub.com/news/81043.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/81043.html - click here


H5 Strain of Avian Influenza in Texas

WASHINGTON - Feb 23/04 - SNS -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture today confirmed that the H5N2 strain of avian influenza in a flock of chickens in Texas is highly pathogenic avian influenza, the first such case in the United States in 20 years. http://www.statpub.com/news/81055.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/81055.html - click here


U.S. Faces Wider Poultry Bans

WASHINGTON - Feb 24/04 - SNS -- The number of countries and regions banning imports of U.S. poultry and products rose sharply over night following the USDA's admission the strain of avian influenza found in the state of Texas was the highly pathogenic H5N2 strain. http://www.statpub.com/news/81085.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/81085.html - click here


Canada Restricts, Mexico Bans U.S. Poultry

WASHINGTON - Feb 24/04 - SNS -- Mexico has closed its border to all imports of U.S. origin chicken and products on account of the discovery of the highly pathogenic H5N2 strain of avian influenza on a farm in Texas. http://www.statpub.com/news/81093.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/81093.html - click here


FAO Warns Bird Flu Controls Must Continue

ROME - Feb 25/04 - SNS -- The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warns that efforts to control and prevent the spread of avian influenza cannot be relaxed until it is clear the disease has been brought under control. http://www.statpub.com/news/81276.html - . . . Continue or visitors http://www.statpub.com/open/81276.html - click here

More info for 2002, 2003, 2005 at bottom of this page http://www.statpub.com/statpoulfeb04.html - http://www.statpub.com/statpoulfeb04.html
 
 


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:25am

H5N2 used to be the low path.  Now H5N1 has a low path too? 

I would expect more bans to follow.   It's hard to say what this could lead to for MI poultry, or worse. 
 
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:33am

Jhetta,

Thanks for the clarification on the LPAI H5NI. I guess what I was trying to say was that I hadn't heard much in the media on the way of LPAI "North American" H5NI. I did see your sequences and am aware of LPAI in the past (especially after the White House Briefing). For the record--You have done a great job of listing references and information here, and I really appreciate your efforts. You bring a lot of expertise to this area.  There is a lot of information out there for the layperson to muddle through, so thanks for bringing me up to speed --"Argly." -- Argyll.
 
p.s. That is a lot of sequencs for H5 and H7 listed  in the U.S.--


Posted By: joseph
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:46am
OFF TOPIC

Saw on tv last night that in pierce county panel meets to
pass city ordinance to require non-conmercial bird breaders to conform to guidelines on keeping birds and inspections by vets under department of agriculter quidence and rules adopted into city. Good job pierce county.


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 11:47am
The summertime heat would slow it down considerably.     


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 12:41pm
I personally think the potential for a trade ban is why we have not seen prior disclosures of H5N1 here and elsewhere as well.  The economic tolls are going to be disasterous.   We know from experience what one sick cow did to our meat industry so holding off disclosure of H5N1 as long as possible should be expected.  So could it be that since they are finally disclosing the finding of H5N1 here means this this is closer and or bigger than we have been told so far.  Tony Snow the new white house spokesman did an expert job handling the original white house conference on this which for me presents an interesting dillema.  When he was a reporter/radio guy he would eat white house spokesmen for breakfast and was relentless and lethal in getting to the truth on subjects.  So I am worried his expertise will give the white house the upper hand in protecting the truth and manipulation of the facts as they see fit.


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 12:51pm

I too think the White House made a good move.  I'm glad to see that they are on top of it.   



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 7:08pm

Countries are definitely jittery about this.  They've banned poultry in the past, but from what I could tell of Jhetta's posts, viruses were found in chickens on poultry farms.  This is a little different, since these are wild birds on a nature preserve.  Maybe  the public should tell their governments not to panic, instead of vice versa.



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 16 2006 at 9:33pm

GR I agree!

Aside from being asleep at the wheel, a countries government would not want to appear non-responsive to an outbreak at all.  This is the catch-22 of the pandemic....to respond or repress....either way you are screwed.  You respond, you alert the world you are infected and become poisonous with any product you desire to sell; if you repress vital information and you are found guitly of deception, you are further shunned by a world better served by more trustworthy allies.  Unfortunately, it's really all about world economics and ordinary citizens will pay the price.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 4:08am

Russia to Halt U.S. Poultry Imports Over Fears of Bird Flu

Created: 17.08.2006 14:29 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 14:58 MSK <> document.write(get_ago(1155812330)); , 4 minutes ago

MosNews

Russia, the world’s largest poultry importer, may halt its imports of the product from the U.S. state of Michigan, because two birds infected with avian influenza (bird flu) were discovered there last week, the country’s Federal Veterinary Service said on Wednesday, Aug. 16.

The service will tighten controls over U.S. poultry supplies while it waits for an official report from the United States, the Interfax agency reported, citing an interview with Alexei Alexeyenko, the veterinary service’s press secretary.

The two Michigan birds found to be infected with avian influenza do not have the lethal form that is spreading elsewhere in the world, U.S. officials said on Aug. 14.

Control over U.S. meat exports is one of the last issues to be resolved in the WTO accession negotiations between Russia and the United States. The two countries were expected to sign the final protocol on the eve of the G8 summit, which took place in St. Petersburg in the middle of July. After months of negotiations the sides were able to reach agreements on contentious issues from access of foreign banks and insurance companies to the Russian markets and protection of intellectual property in the country, which is ridden with copyright piracy. But at the last moment the sides failed to reach an agreement on meat and poultry exports. The United States demanded that the exports be allowed freely, without any additional examinations by the Russian veterinary authorities. The Russian side insisted that special veterinary commissions have to check the U.S. producers that want to export their products to Russia before they are given the green light. The bird flu case is likely to give the Russian side a new trump card in negotiations regarding this issue.
http://www.birdflubreakingnews.com/templates/birdflu/window.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mosnews.com%2Fmoney%2F2006%2F08%2F17%2Frussiapoultry.shtml - http://www.birdflubreakingnews.com/templates/birdflu/window.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mosnews.com%2Fmoney%2F2006%2F08%2F17%2Frussiapoultry.shtml


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 4:11am
This is just game playing... they were already balking on the poultry trade issue... the talks broke down last month.
 
Russia has active H5N1 infections of the virolent Asian variety in many regions!


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 5:36am
Jhetta,
 
I read the article on the Russian ban -- excellent story. Any idea how many miles between Russia -- Siberia and Alaska?
 
Note: Thanks candles for the links. 55 miles is kind of close.


Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 5:37am
Of course it's game playing.  S. Korea and Mexico went first and now Russia.  I'm waiting to see what Canada will do since it's in N. America. One major outbreak in the U.S. and a lot, if not all, of the exports will stop.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 5:57am
Originally posted by argyll argyll wrote:

Jhetta,
 
I read the article on the Russian ban -- excellent story. Any idea how many miles between Russia -- Siberia and Alaska?
 
href= - NPO Theme Page: Frequently Asked Questions
The shortest distance from the USA and Siberia is 55 miles across Bering Strait from Cape Prince of Wales in Alaska to Cape Dezhnev in Russia. ...
www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/faq.html - 17k - http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:qneNJs8H8HgJ:www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/faq.html+how+many+miles+between+russia+siberia+and+alaska&hl=en&gl=au&ct=clnk&cd=7 - Cached - http://www.google.com.au/search?hl=en&lr=&q=related:www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/faq.html - Similar pages


Posted By: Jhetta
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 10:58am
 
Yes Actually I do...  I put most of the major flyways on this... I would expect southern migration this fall.  We can see where they will be coming from and therefor which strains are likely to appear from each region of infection.
 
 
Here is another view concentrating on Africa
 


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 17 2006 at 4:31pm
Jhetta,
 
Thanks for posting the map -- it is really cool.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 6:23am
I have refrained from posting since the Michigan incident was announced.
The rational behind this was that as the political, economic, and media spin wheels churned, it would be premature to make any observations. It was also the knowledge that when I finally posted my thoughts on this, it might generate a lot of negative posts towards my comments as well as tend to make the hardliners take a very aggresive stance to dismember my comments by declaring me an alarmist. I will be surprised if this does not happen, but I think are those who will follow the logic and sincerity of this post.

Instead of probable, which has been used in many political statements, I will use the term likely. It is likely we have H5N1 in the U.S. Countries are beginning to ban imports of our poultry products as we knew they would if we announced it even might be in the U.S.

The fact that there have been outbreaks in the past is not new news. And the fact that this seems to be quoted "well we have had them in this year and that year and so forth" does not make the current cases any less ominous or a problem for the United States. It is like saying, well we have had Pandemics before in 1918 and several times so this is nothing new. The Bubonic plague is nothing new. Certain virulent diseases have swept the planet since the times of the Egyptians. This has got to be the weakest logic, criteria or statements I have ever heard. We have had this or seen this before. So what? We had the holocaust before. We had World Wars before. We have had many things before? Who writes this stuff for people to say?

I would assume the inferfence is that we have seen it before and we are all still alive (most of us) and there was no Pandemic.  Well, there were Pandemics. And people died. Millions.

On dozens of posts I have presented documentation of this moving from low path to high path, in birds and it can in people. What is basically happeninig is you have the event. H5N1 has been identified and now all the media and release mufflers or on so the public will not panic, the economy won't take a nose dive, and we are being given a flurry of scientific "this is being handled in the top labs with the most advanced methods and so forth."  Can we stop it? Our medical system is not read to handle a Pandemic. We can simply hope, if it happens, to survive it.

The idea is to dilute the incident and calm everyone's nerves and keep all the other countries from banning our poultry.

As the press and government releases dig back through old data, and some of this is old - stuff from May is old - we are in August.  Statements like - well it has been endogenous in the bird population and the sudden emergence of a "North American H5N1" which is not high path raising the yard stick to 80+ percent to make it high path.  This is circle talk. It is politics. It is well designed and translated - birds have been crawling with viruses for hundreds of years and it hasn't jumped to people. Well, look at China okay, and Thailand, and Vietnam. It has. People are dying from it. Wake up and smell the coffee people. Don't panic. Just dig in, grit your teeth, and prepare. If it doesn't happen. Great. I mean it. Great.

This is all semantics and euphemisms. If over half of the birds or people who catch it die, it is high path to me. Its like adjusting warning levels to fit the situation so we are not at a higher alert.  I have worked with facilities that have sequencers and we do not have to incubate a lot of whatever to take a look at the virus and know what the score is.

With a patient and a little common sense, and a 2-4 hour test you can determine if it is pretty likely it's Avian. That test has been around awhile. I have talked to or corresponded with Vietnamese doctors or nurses who cared for  the specific  outbreak cases  of human transmissions. I have seen pics of the X-rays of the lungs, and for several days, simply sat back and observed as the news leaks into the media. 

It does not take two weeks. Considering we had data months ago on certain situations, and weeks ago, the time is up for knowing what it is.
I have talked to scientists who run the tests, what tests they use, and what tests not effective or considered dinosaur in virology and genetics and posted it. They know the score. The swams were tested twice before a word was said about anything.

Understand, it is much safer for me to sit back and be silent and let the media flood the net with official sounding technology which does not reflect the situation.

The pathways are open and the birds will be heading south or will be be soon I believe.

The truth is that humans have had a multiple variety of flu for decades. Flu has got to be the most ridiculous word ever conceived to describe a disease. It is meaningless. The fact the "stomach flu" keeps trying to establish itself as a real word has a reason. And that is because Avian can mutate to a virus, may have mutated to a virus that is intestinal as it is in birds, and therefore gets pushed into "what we see every year."  Do not tell me this. After 40 years in medicine I already know what we see every year.

Never having developed the tough skin of the traditional medical type, when I read things like "well every year flu sweeps through the U.S. and we have periods where GI outbreaks occur and it is just the mutation that happens naturally.

Death is natural. That does not mean it is acceptable for millions of people to die each year. Ebola is natural. That is like saying excrement is organic.
I belong to a group of scientists who don't particularly like death or disease. And honestly, we would like to wipe disease off the face of the planet. That includes Avian.  Not take the approach of the physician after the operation where  the patient expires and says "Well, you know statistically we lose a few. Go tell the family."
 
There is a point here. It is like euphemisms in the funeral industyr. Dearly Departed, the Loved One. A classic psychological tool and manipulation of the American public - telling a patient you "just have the flu" is absurd. Thousands of people die from the flu. The point is, the current medical system in many cases is impotent to treat disease. Instead of just saying,
we don't know what to do, or you are wasting your time if you have the "the flu" when you can go home, take aspirin, and drink plenty of liquids, is just saying, this is beyond our skills or knowledge at the present time.

When Aviian hits, if it does with any force, people will be told  to stay home.

Conclusions : Now let's make this very clear. Other doctors, nurses, health people may find this alarmist. Most of my family are in the hospital right now and I probably should be for a never ending stomach. Every diagnostic test has been done and they still don't know what it is. I have friends in Europe who have "something" which is not classic Avian but is making them very sick.

So, this is my opinion. You can read all that claim to be experts and form your own. I don't claim to be and expert. I think we have a problem. Let's be real here. You don't want to define something as high path so you raise the yardstick where the kill ratio is close to Ebola so our poultry exports won't be banned all over the globe.

Albert, I think the low path has already been here for years, even some in people. I talked to a virologist in Switzerland and they were discussing also, as others here, the definition of disease.

There is no shame in the medical establishment admitting that just as the war on drugs, and other endeavors, we are not doing well on the war on disease. There are chronic established diseases which are endogenous to our population. c. dificil 5% - some reports 50% in children under 18 months. How do we get around this?

Semantics. We call them friendly fauna. So with Avian? We say well, we have always know that the bird species is crawling with viruses  they just live with. Personally, although I know many strains of many things are in us all, I don't want to be crawling with viruses I just live with.

I don't want to spend the next decade of my life with some low path Avian strain which won't kill me, just gives me a tummy ache every day and is not just a part of the "seasonal GI" but has infected our family for two years. And these are sister-in-laws, people with entirely different bodies and not biologically related.

This is opinion. I bought more water yesterday and a lot of Top Ramen. This incuded dog food, cat food, bird food - etc. We like animals.

Nothing will be more convincing than reality. And if there is no serious Pandemic, fine to be called an alarmist and be wrong.

Just keep quoting statistics and raising levels so that we don't ever have to say - it is here - until the numbers are so high and the trip levers are super glued it will be like the guy in Iraq with U.S. tanks rolling up the steps and telling his people (Minister of Information) the Americans are a hundred miles from Baghdad. Not fair to people who need to prepare and be ready. Comforting - but not a true picture at all.


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 6:43am
Medclinicain,
 
What in the world do you propose that we do about all these low grade infectious agents that according to you plague the human population?  Have you never considered the possibility that the treatment might be worse than the "infection" itself?  Do you want us to go around giving vancomycin to the large percentage of infants who currently live with c.dif?  The world cannot be made sterile, the medical community is already  overextended, so we concentrate on the pathogens causing significant disease.  What would you have us do?
 
Exactly what kind of medical clinician are you?
 
gardener


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 7:54am
Originally posted by gardener gardener wrote:

Medclinicain,
 
What in the world do you propose that we do about all these low grade infectious agents that according to you plague the human population?  Have you never considered the possibility that the treatment might be worse than the "infection" itself?  Do you want us to go around giving vancomycin to the large percentage of infants who currently live with c.dif?  The world cannot be made sterile, the medical community is already  overextended, so we concentrate on the pathogens causing significant disease.  What would you have us do?
 
Exactly what kind of medical clinician are you?
 
gardener


I know you are a highly qualified person Gardener and practice medicine and I certainly respect your opinions and comments. I always have. And I actually appreciate the restraint you have shown here in not really launching into this.

I am retired from the medical clinics, seeing patients, writing scripts. Remember Vietnam was a long time ago, and I was active even then. But I am active in medical research, virology, genetics, and am in the current loop to develop new medical technology. I have been asked frequently in one way or another, this same line of enquiry. The above is all I will ever say. I also still am connected to go out into the field to natural disasters and unnatural disasters.

You are a serious and grounded doctor I believe, and are active and see patients and deal daily probably in an ER or Clinic with them. And you know your stuff. These are positive comments. Everything you have said is right on target, Gardener.

We do have some solutions on the horizon though. Nothing is worse than someone bemoaning the problems with no solutions. That just creates fear with no hope. And that is not the intention here.

First off, antibiotics or anti-virals are not the solution. That is why Tamiflu is not the answer either. We have one clincial trial in Japan where 15-20% developed resistant strains in the first pass. I have posted the actual step by step mechanism and process showing the development at the sequence level and process of the resistance to Tamiflu. So if you gave Vancomycin to all the toddlers, and it's already been done, you will have at least a  20% relapse rate, since c. dificil forms spores.  However the problem is not  c. dificil. It is the damage caused to the natural flora  balance and natural barrier in the wall, the lining of the intestine.

The primary medical rant here is because it is not only my, but other researchers as well, opinion, that it is possible Avian, which is classically an intestinal and almost symbiotic (many birds appear quite healthy and asymptomatic) may mutate to an intestinal pathogen in humans.

If you think our line of defenses are weak against pulmonary diseases- especially ones that require respirators- more armies have died from bowel problems than swords or bullets.

Try to keep this Avian related. Conventional medicine probably will not be effective and even if it is - as in some strains treated by Tamiflu - imagine the resistant strains developed when you give 400,000,000 doses of this to treat a Pandemic. 

Some doctors have enquired or commented on using injected vaccines of antibodies, or pushing more on using Relenza which can be injected rather than inhaled.

http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=49114 - http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=49114

This is current. I have spoken to people in the drug company developing Relenza and this is a very promising drug; although studies have show Avian can develop resistance to it as well. The problem, as quoted by Jhetta perhaps, is that the key ingredient is made in China, and there is quite a political and economic struggle going on as to who will make the billions for producing the effective anti-viral or vaccine for Avian.

The magic bullet, which we do not have time to develop, we will need a "vaccine patch kit" which one virologist I spoke to stated they could alter the vaccine in several weaks to changes in the virus. I may have posted links to this this company which I am not connected to.

Make no mistake. Behind the scenes people in CDC and WHO are literally working 24/7 on new technologies which could rejuvinate the immune system so the body can fight this off itself (very simplistic but this is not a medical journal here).

I think most of us want this to stay low path in humans period. The longer the better. The more time we have before it decides to jump clusters on us, like the 6/7 mortality types we have seen in Vietnam, the better weapons we will have to fight it.

This forum is discussion. And realize, sometimes, I do get a bit weary of tip-toeing around the obvious.

You know, if you worked with the Federal government, and I am not an employee of the Federal government, that there are situations where we are not ready and we are attempting to become more ready.

People need the truth. Everytime the government, and there is a new face to our top levels of security and health organizations, releases information, such as the swan in Michigan data to the press, it is like biting the bullet while someone performs surgery on you.

This data must go out there. People need time to digest danger and problems. You would be amazed how resilent the American public is to bad news. Read the headlines.

Thank you for the feedback. No. As I said, doctors I went to over at Oakland Naval Base across the bay from  Stanford in the 50s - some went to school when there were no antibiotics. And one time very ill I got an injection of penicillin that cured whatever I had in hours. Today it would be useless.

What you need in the ER down the road is for a truck to roll up and boxes of vaccine to come in the door - militia to guard the people giving it and the vaccine itself.

The point here is not hopelessness. It is to say we need to focus on reality. We need to be able to give people more than soothing words or try to look professional when we simply don't have the tools we need to help them.

Just an opinion. Something tells me I will never get to quit working on these things or trying to function amidst a pretty complex system already in place. We are on the same team. And I hope we win.

http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/2002/11_02/joyce3.htm - http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/2002/11_02/joyce3.htm



Posted By: Albert
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 8:18am
So in other words, medclinician is not a doctor.   


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 8:21am
yes, i picked up on that too. Medclinician: i am disappointed because your name implies otherwise. You may be very knowledgeable and I appreciate your comments and sympathize with your difficulties but why imply that you are a clinician?

cli·ni·cian (kl-nshn)
n.
A physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist specializing in the treatment of patients, not in other areas such as research.

For example:

A researcher with a Ph.D studying Onclytic Viruses and novel cancer therapeutics is quite different than a clinician on the front lines with patients.


Not to be too hard on you medclinician, you seem to know a lot more than most about the science.



Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 9:54am
http://www.answers.com/topic/clinician

cli·ni·cian (klĭ-nĭsh'ən) pronunciation
n.
  1. A health professional, such as a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or nurse, involved in clinical practice, as distinguished from one specializing in research.
  2. A health professional who practices at a clinic.
Once again - to be clear - I am retired as working in clinics. One clinic I ran during the Vietnam war in Mainz, Germany - saw patients and prescribed drugs - wrote scripts -  treated patients, ordered labs - etc.

Considering the decades I worked in clinics, hospitals, ERs and so forth, I chose my handle, and would ask more focus be placed on the data and research I have posted, all of which is accurate and appropriate to the current situation.

I wish I had the time to go back to working in clinics and have had numerous invitations even in the last few months to do so as well as go into administration.











Posted By: Pegasus
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 10:04am
     I'm not seeing anything shocking or alarmist in anything medclinician said.   And I don't believe you have to be a doctor to know that there are many things living dormant in our bodies or at stages of low lying activity that can eventually act up and cause problems that prescriptions alone don't really address.  Anyone familiar with holistic medicine?  Take care of the whole person, not just the 'disease'.  Keep your body in the best conditon possible and allow it to do what it does best.  I wash fruits & veggies before I eat them to remove pesticides and other residue.  Does that make me an alarmist for cutting a risk factor?  I'll save my liver & heart damage for the occasional glass of wine or a good black angus steak, thank you. 
     Nobody can avoid everything (not sanely anyhow) but it's certainly not a bad thing to avoid as many high risk items as reasonably possible.  Sometimes I think Government is often like parenting.  Parents try to determine how much information is needed without causing panic or unnecessary fear in our children but enough to keep them alert to potential problems (Stranger danger and drugs for example).   We want our children (and ourselves) to feel that we have things under control and can keep them safe from harm.  But there is always a new danger lurking.  So we gradually give them the tools they need to help themselves to the best of their abilities.  We cannot always control what happens to us but we CAN control how we respond to it.    
     Let's face it, there are diseases & problems passed to us from heredity, living environment (pollution, flooding, drought, crime), fish (mercury comes to mind), cows, pigs, chickens, etc.  There are damaging effects of pesticides and acid rain on vegetation - but then there is limited produce if something is not done to control pests.  Sugar and butter are 'bad' for you but so are the carcinogenic chemicals used to make some of the substitutes.   It's considered unethical to wear leather shoes (poor bessie the heifer) but plastic footwear uses the petroleum (evil oil companies) we are supposed to be weaning ourselves from. 
     Some people say they want to go back to life before 9/11 when 'things were safe'.  September 10th wasn't any safer - we just lived in a state of blissful ignorance and denial.  "Go about your business folks - nothing to see here."  Avoiding reality doesn't make it go away.   The day before I found this forum, I knew nothing about Bird Flu.  It still existed.  Some days I am scared but mostly I am glad to have the resources (support & ideas shared with all of you) to help me work on an everchanging and evolving plan to do what I can to best protect my family in the event of a pandemic. 
     Why is it so easy to assume that Indonesia and China are lying to us about their statistics (early untested deaths) but so hard to think that some wild bird flew across the Bering Strait without being examined and potentially infected North American wildlife with some form of AI or something else?  Maybe we know about it and maybe we don't.  Just knowing that it is possible should make us want to remain vigilant in our own preparations and hopeful that every report will make another person consider an emergency plan for their own family.
     Hopefully scientists and medical experts will be quick on the tail of an AI H2H outbreak with a suitable vaccine but if they didn't speculate potentials & possiblilties, that could never happen in a timely manner.  So they keep looking/prepping for a vaccine and I keep prepping for the possibility of a prolonged time before that vaccine is ready.  One can't panic every time you get a warning about a potential problem but it is prudent to put that information into your mental file and proceed accordingly.  It's all just information until you get other pieces to the same puzzle and start to assemble a bigger picture.
     Expect the best but prepare for the worst.   
 
Thanks for letting me get that out of my system. 


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     "We do not know the true value of moments until they have undergone the test of memory."   unknown author


Posted By: Guests
Date Posted: August 18 2006 at 10:06am
the way things are going we may all end up as clinicians Unhappy



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